SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDICES

for

The Democratic Embargo: Regime Type and Proxy War

APPENDIX A: Coding the Democratic Embargo

Our investigation into the existence, strength, and violation of the democratic embargo relies on prominent, commonly used data sources in the International Relations (IR) literature. As described in the main text, to define our population of cases (irregular conflicts in which rebels fight incumbent governments) and the provision of support to such rebels by third-party actors, we rely on the Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict dataset (NSA), compiled by David E. Cunningham, Kristian Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan (2013), and the State-Non-State Armed Groups Cooperation dataset (NAGs), compiled by Belgin San-Akca (2016). To define the regime type of both incumbent and patron governments, we rely primarily on the Polity (v4.0) dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2012). As we note in the main text, our reliance on the Polity data represents an extremely *conservative* manner of operationalization that biases *against* finding support for the existence of a democratic embargo. This is because, by virtue of the indicators that Polity uses to define regime type, it is more permissive in categorizing different governments as "democratic." Using alternative conceptualizations of "democracy" present in the IR literature only strengthens support for the democratic embargo. To substantiate this point in this Appendix, we also discuss the coding rules for regime type categorization in the V-Dem and Freedom House projects and show that only a small fraction of the 35 potential violations of the democratic embargo identified with the Polity data would be considered potential violations by these alternative measures.

Population of Cases

Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict (NSA) Dataset

This dataset is an expansion of the information collected as part of the Uppsala Armed Conflict Data project. Conflicts are included if they (1) involve the government of the state, (2) take place primarily within the state, (3) involve organized opposition forces, (4) are fought for control of either the government or territory, and (5) generate twenty-five battle deaths in a calendar year. The unit of analysis is the conflict dyad period. The dyad is comprised of the incumbent state and the rebel group. As there may be multiple rebel groups fighting an incumbent at the same time, a larger "war" may be comprised of multiple dyadic conflicts, each of which are coded separately. The dataset provides information on 578 rebel-state dyads engaged in active internal conflicts waged between 1946 and 2011 (Cunningham et al., 2013).

State-Non-State Armed Groups Cooperation (NAGs) Dataset

This dataset is also an expansion of the information collected as part of the Uppsala Armed Conflict Data project. Conflicts are included if they feature named, active rebel groups waging armed conflicts against incumbent governments for the purpose of changing the political system or the control of territory that reach the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths. The dyad is comprised of the incumbent state and rebel group. In contrast to NSA, the dyads are reported on a yearly basis, rather than on a conflict basis. The dataset provides information on 460 rebel groups engaged in violent conflicts with states between 1946 and 2010 (San-Akca, 2016).

Democratic Embargo Population

We combine the NSA and NAGs datasets to create the most comprehensive existing dataset of irregular conflicts waged by incumbent governments and rebel groups between 1946 and 2011. As noted in the main text, there is considerable correspondence between the two datasets, though each includes conflict dyads the other omits. Specifically, NSA includes 47 cases that NAGs does not while NAGs includes nine cases that NSA does not. The combined dataset defining our population of cases thus covers 587 dyads. We exclude cases of coups d'état, which we regard as conceptually distinct from rebels waging armed conflicts against government forces (Luttwak, 1979). Our resultant population of cases comprises 534 rebel-state dyads that fought irregular conflicts between 1946 and 2011.

Provision of Support

Non-State Actors in Armed Conflict (NSA) Dataset

Rebels are coded as receiving support if one or more third parties provided them with material assistance (including troops, weapons, logistics, training, money, and assistance in international fora) and/or sanctuary (territory in the patron's homeland where rebels can equip and regroup) (Cunningham et al., 2013: 523–524).

State-Non-State Armed Groups Cooperation (NAGs) Dataset

Rebels are coded as receiving support if one or more third parties provided them with assistance like training camps, safe haven, arms and equipment, money, or troops. The provision of support is coded as intentional or de facto in nature. Patronage is deemed intentional when the "evidence is clear that states create channels to abet certain groups" and "multiple reliable sources [were] used to confirm information for each case of support." Patronage is deemed de facto when "a rebel group is able to operate within the borders of a country without clear evidence of sponsorship of that country's state" (San-Akca, 2016: 172).

Democratic Embargo Provision of Support

We use the information derived from the NSA and NAGs datasets to identify instances of third-party patronage of rebels. We include different information from the two sources. From the NSA dataset, we include instances of the provision of material assistance because only those incidents necessarily represent deliberate decisions taken by patrons. From the NAGs dataset, we include instances of the intentional provision of assistance, whether such aid was material or sanctuary in form.

The close correspondence between the NSA and NAGs datasets meant that, as we combined information from the datasets, some instances of the provision of sanctuary identified in the NSA dataset were included because NAGs identified such aid as intentional. Our resulting dataset designates 324 of the 534 cases (61%) as those in which rebels received third party assistance.

The variable is *side_b_supp*, coded 1 if any patron intentionally provided aid and 0 if not.

<u>Regime Type</u>

<u>Polity (v4.0)</u>

Polity is the most commonly used indicator of regime type in the quantitative study of IR. It conceives of democracy as a form of governance comprised of three "essential, interdependent elements": (1) "the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders," (2) "the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive," and (3) "the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation" (Marshall et al., 2017: 14). Using six component indicators that address these three interrelated elements and are weighted to varying degrees, Polity assigns composite values to regimes ranging from -10 (most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic). Following convention in the International Relations literature, we use a cut-off of +6; states that are coded as +6 or greater are considered democratic while those that are +5 or less are nondemocratic.

Using these basic numbers, we create several variables to indicate when incumbents and patrons were democratic. For all incumbents, we code the following (*variable name* in parentheses):

1. Polity score at the beginning of the conflict and whether that score met the +6 and/or +7 threshold for democracy (*side_a_polity_beg*, *side_a_dem6_beg*, and *side_a_dem7_beg*)
2. The highest Polity score achieved during the conflict (*side_a_polity_high*)
3. The lowest Polity score achieved during the conflict (*side_a_polity_low*)
4. Whether the actor was democratic at the +6 and/or +7 threshold at any point during the conflict, coded 1 if yes and 0 if no (*side_a_polity6_any* and *side_a_polity7_any*)
5. Whether the actor was democratic at the +6 and/or +7 threshold throughout the conflict, coded 1 if yes and 0 if no (*side_a_dem6_throughout* and *side_a_dem7_throughout*)

In cases where there was at least one patron, we create equivalent variables that code the regime type characteristics for all third-party participants (*variable name* in parentheses, where *X* denotes the number of the third-party patron):

1. Polity score at the beginning of the conflict and whether that score met the +6 and/or +7 threshold for democracy (*side_b_suppX_polity_beg*, *side_b_suppX_dem6_beg*, and *side_b_suppX_dem7_beg*)
2. The highest Polity score achieved during the conflict (*side_b_suppX_polity_high*)
3. The lowest Polity score achieved during the conflict (*side_b_suppX_polity_low*)
4. Whether the actor was democratic at the +6 and/or +7 threshold at any point during the conflict, coded 1 if yes and 0 if no (*side_b_suppX_dem6_any* and *side_b_suppX_dem7_any*)
5. Whether the actor was democratic at the +6 and/or +7 threshold throughout the conflict, coded 1 if yes and 0 if no (*side_b_suppX_dem6_throughout* and *side_b_suppX_dem7_throughout*)

Using the variables coded for any third-party patrons, we create aggregate indicators for all such actors. When only one patron exists, the values for these aggregate indicators reflect the characteristics of that actor. When more than one patron exists, the values for these aggregate indicators reflects the characteristics of the most democratic actor (*variable name* in parentheses):

1. Whether any patron was democratic at the +6 and/or +7 threshold at the beginning of the conflict, coded 1 if yes and 0 if no (*side_b_supp_dem6_beg* and *side_b_supp_dem7_beg*)
2. Whether any patron was democratic at the +6 and/or +7 threshold at any point during the conflict, coded 1 if yes and 0 if no (*side_b_supp_dem6_any* and *side_b_supp_dem7_any*)
3. Whether any patron was democratic at the +6 and/or +7 threshold throughout the conflict, coded 1 if yes and 0 if no (*side_b_dem6_throughout* and *side_b_dem7_throughout*)

Alternative Regime Type Specifications

There are multiple indices of regime type used in IR and our finding of support for the democratic embargo and its robustness could be a function of the particular indicator we have chosen. To alleviate such concerns, we considered multiple other indicators of regime type, including an alternative Polity cut-off score, V-Dem Project indices, and Freedom House indicators. In each case, the alternative indicators designated fewer—and sometimes dramatically fewer—regimes as democracies and decreased the number of potential violations of the democratic embargo observed in our population of cases. Reliance on these alternative indicators would *strengthen*, not weaken, support for the democratic embargo. To illustrate, in the remainder of this subsection, we describe each of the alternative indicators and then present tables highlighting which of the 35 potential violations of the democratic embargo identified using our primary measure of regime type would still be considered potential violations (for the statistics identifying 35 potential violations of the democratic embargo, see Appendix B).

Polity (v4.0) +7 Threshold

Setting the cut-off for which regimes count as democracies at +7, rather than +6, eliminates 13 (37%) potential violations of the democratic embargo. In Table A.1, the 35 identified potential violations are listed. Those dyads highlighted <mark>YELLOW</mark> are those that would also be considered potential violations using this measure. Note: The identified potential violations do not account for our subsequent investigation into the existence of aid, periods of joint democracy, or the existence of aid during periods of joint democracy.

Table A.1:   Polity (v4.0) +7 Cut-Off

Incumbent-Patron(s)	Rebel Group	Dates	Incumbent and Patron(s) Polity > 6
France-United States	Viet Nam Doc Dong Min Hoi	1946-1954	✓
France-United States	FLN	1954-1962	✓
India-Pakistan	NNC	1956-1968	✓
Myanmar-India	KIO	1961-1992	✓

Sudan-Israel	Anya Nya	1963-1972	✔
UK-Ireland	PIRA/IRA	1971-1991	✔
Bangladesh-India	JSS/SB/Shanti Bahini	1975-1992	
El Salvador-Nicaragua	FMLN	1980-1991	
Nicaragua-US (and others)	FDN/Contras	1982-1990	
India-Pakistan	PLA	1982-1988	✔
Sudan-Israel	SPLM	1983-2004	✔
India-Pakistan	Sikh Insurgents	1983-1993	✔
Turkey-Greece	PKK/Kadek	1984-2011	✔
Peru-Nicaragua	MRTA	1989-1993	
India-Pakistan	Kashmir Insurgents	1989-2011	✔
India-Pakistan	Naxalites/PWG	1990-2004	✔
India-Pakistan	UFLA	1990-2009	✔
Senegal-Gambia	MFDC	1990-2003	✔
Turkey-Greece	Devrimci Sol	1991-1992	✔
India-Pakistan	MCC	1992-2004	✔
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	NSCN	1992-2000	✔
India-Pakistan	ATTF	1992-1993	✔
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	BDSF/NDFB	1992-2004	✔
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	UNLF	1994-2009	✔
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	NLFT	1995-2006	✔
Nepal-India	CPN-M/UPF	1996-2006	
India-Pakistan	ATTF	1997-1999	✔
Russia-Georgia	Republic of Chechnya	1999-2007	
Israel-Russia	PFLP	2001	
Thailand-Malaysia	Patani Insurgents	2003-2011	
Pakistan-India	BLA/Baluchistan Liberation Army	2004-2011	
Georgia-Russia	Republic of South Ossetia	2004	
India-Pakistan	CPI-Maoist	2005-2011	
Pakistan-United States, Israel, and India	TTP	2008-2011	
India-Pakistan	GNLA	2009-2011	

V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index

The V-Dem Project offers an alternative set of measures of regime type centered around what its creators deem to be the five high-level principles of democracy: electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian (Pemstein et al., 2019). Indices of regime type are created along each of the five concepts, with multiple categorization rules and cut-offs that classify some governments as at least "minimally democratic" and others as non-democratic (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Luehrmann, Marquardt, McMann, Paxton, Pemstein, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Wilson, et al., 2019).

The "Electoral Democracy" index (variable: *polyarchy*), in the words of its creator, seeks to assess the extent to which there is "electoral competition for the electorate's approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, [whether] there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance" (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Luehrmann, Marquardt, McMann, Paxton,

Pemstein, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Cornell, et al., 2019: 39). There are three ordinal indices of this variable: one with three categories (Autocratic, Electoral Authoritarian, and Minimally Democratic), one with four categories (Autocratic, Electoral Authoritarian, Minimally Democratic, and Democratic), and one with five categories (Closed Autocratic, Autocratic, Electoral Authoritarian, Minimally Democratic, and Democratic). In Table A.2, the 35 identified potential violations are listed. X's represent actors that achieved "Minimally Democratic" status for at least one year during the conflict. Where multiple patrons are listed, the score for the highest-rated democracy is used. Those dyads highlighted YELLOW are those that would, by at least one measure in this index, be considered potential violations of the democratic embargo. As can be seen using this indicator excludes 19 of the 35 cases (54%) of potential violations. Note: The identified potential violations do not account for our subsequent investigation into the existence of aid, periods of joint democracy, or the existence of aid during periods of joint democracy.

Table A.2:   V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index

Incumbent-Patron(s)	Rebel Group	Dates	Incumbent Polyarchy			Patron(s) Polyarchy		
			3C	4C	5C	3C	4C	5C
France-United States	Viet Nam Doc Dong Min Hoi	1946-1954	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
France-United States	FLN	1954-1968	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	NNC	1956-1968	✓	✓	✓			
Myanmar-India	KIO	1961-1992				✓	✓	✓
Sudan-Israel	Anya Nya	1963-1972				✓	✓	✓
UK-Ireland	PIRA/IRA	1971-1991	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bangladesh-India	JSS/SB/Shanti Bahini	1975-1992		✓		✓	✓	✓
El Salvador-Nicaragua	FMLN	1980-1991				✓	✓	✓
Nicaragua-US (and others)	FDN/Contras	1982-1990	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	PLA	1982-1988	✓	✓	✓			
Sudan-Israel	SPLM	1983-2004				✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	Sikh Insurgents	1983-1993	✓	✓	✓			
Turkey-Greece	PKK/Kadek	1984-2011	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Peru-Nicaragua	MRTA	1989-1993	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	Kashmir Insurgents	1989-2011	✓	✓	✓		✓	
India-Pakistan	Naxalites/PWG	1990-2004	✓	✓	✓			
India-Pakistan	UFLA	1990-2009	✓	✓	✓			
Senegal-Gambia	MFDC	1990-2003	✓	✓	✓			
Turkey-Greece	Devrimci Sol	1991-1992	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	MCC	1992-2004	✓	✓	✓			
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	NSCN	1992-2000	✓	✓	✓		✓	
India-Pakistan	ATTF	1992-1993	✓	✓	✓			
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	BDSF/NDFB	1992-2004	✓	✓	✓			
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	UNLF	1994-2009	✓	✓	✓		✓	
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	NLFT	1995-2006	✓	✓	✓			
Nepal-India	CPN-M/UPF	1996-2006				✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	ATTF	1997-1999	✓	✓	✓			
Russia-Georgia	Republic of Chechnya	1999-2007		✓			✓	
Israel-Russia	PFLP	2001	✓	✓	✓			
Thailand-Malaysia	Patani Insurgents	2003-2011	✓	✓				
Pakistan-India	BLA/Baluchistan Liberation Army	2004-2011		✓		✓	✓	✓
Georgia-Russia	Republic of South Ossetia	2004		✓				
India-Pakistan	CPI-Maoist	2005-2011	✓	✓	✓		✓	

<u>V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index</u>

The "Liberal Democracy" index (variable: *libdem*), in the words of its creator, "takes a 'negative' view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. To make this a measure of liberal democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account" (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Luehrmann, Marquardt, McMann, Paxton, Pemstein, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Cornell, et al., 2019: 40). As with the Electoral Democracy index, there are three ordinal indices: one with three categories (Autocratic, Electoral Authoritarian, and Minimally Democratic), one with four categories (Autocratic, Electoral Authoritarian, Minimally Democratic, and Democratic), and one with five categories (Closed Autocratic, Autocratic, Electoral Authoritarian, Minimally Democratic, and Democratic). In Table A.3, the 35 identified potential violations are listed. X's represent actors that achieved "Minimally Democratic" status for at least one year during the conflict. Where multiple patrons are listed, the score for the highest-rated democracy is used. Those dyads highlighted YELLOW are those that would, by at least one measure in this index, be considered potential violations of the democratic embargo. As can be seen using this indicator excludes 31 of the 35 cases (89%) of potential violations. Note: The identified potential violations do not account for our subsequent investigation into the existence of aid, periods of joint democracy, or the existence of aid during periods of joint democracy.

Table A.3:   V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index

Incumbent-Patron(s)	Rebel Group	Dates	Incumbent Libdem			Patron(s) Libdem		
			3C	4C	5C	3C	4C	5C
France-United States	Viet Nam Doc Dong Min Hoi	1946-1954	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
France-United States	FLN	1954-1968	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	NNC	1956-1968	✓	✓				
Myanmar-India	KIO	1961-1992				✓	✓	
Sudan-Israel	Anya Nya	1963-1972				✓	✓	
UK-Ireland	PIRA/IRA	1971-1991	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bangladesh-India	JSS/SB/Shanti Bahini	1975-1992				✓	✓	
El Salvador-Nicaragua	FMLN	1980-1991				✓	✓	
Nicaragua-US (and others)	FDN/Contras	1982-1990				✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	PLA	1982-1988	✓	✓				
Sudan-Israel	SPLM	1983-2004				✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	Sikh Insurgents	1983-1993	✓	✓				
Turkey-Greece	PKK/Kadek	1984-2011	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Peru-Nicaragua	MRTA	1989-1993				✓	✓	
India-Pakistan	Kashmir Insurgents	1989-2011	✓	✓				
India-Pakistan	Naxalites/PWG	1990-2004	✓	✓				
India-Pakistan	UFLA	1990-2009	✓	✓				
Senegal-Gambia	MFDC	1990-2003	✓	✓				
Turkey-Greece	Devrimci Sol	1991-1992				✓	✓	✓

India-Pakistan	MCC	1992-2004	✓	✓				
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	NSCN	1992-2000	✓	✓				
India-Pakistan	ATTF	1992-1993	✓	✓				
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	BDSF/NDFB	1992-2004	✓	✓				
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	UNLF	1994-2009	✓	✓				
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	NLFT	1995-2006	✓	✓				
Nepal-India	CPN-M/UPF	1996-2006				✓	✓	
India-Pakistan	ATTF	1997-1999	✓	✓				
Russia-Georgia	Republic of Chechnya	1999-2007						
Israel-Russia	PFLP	2001	✓	✓	✓			
Thailand-Malaysia	Patani Insurgents	2003-2011						
Pakistan-India	BLA/Baluchistan Liberation Army	2004-2011				✓	✓	
Georgia-Russia	Republic of South Ossetia	2004						
India-Pakistan	CPI-Maoist	2005-2011	✓	✓				
Pakistan-United States, Israel, India	TTP	2008-2011				✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	GNLA	2009-2011	✓	✓				

<u>V-Dem Participatory Democracy Index</u>

The "Participatory Democracy" index (variable: *partipdem*), in the words of its creator, "takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies. To make it a measure of participatory democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account" (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Luehrmann, Marquardt, McMann, Paxton, Pemstein, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Cornell, et al., 2019: 40). As with the Electoral and Liberal Democracy indices, there are three ordinal indices: one with three categories (Autocratic, Electoral Authoritarian, and Minimally Democratic), one with four categories (Autocratic, Electoral Authoritarian, Minimally Democratic, and Democratic), and one with five categories (Closed Autocratic, Autocratic, Electoral Authoritarian, Minimally Democratic, and Democratic). In Table A.4, the 35 identified potential violations are listed. X's represent actors that achieved "Minimally Democratic" status for at least one year during the conflict. Where multiple patrons are listed, the score for the highest-rated democracy is used. Those dyads highlighted <mark>YELLOW</mark> are those that would, by at least one measure in this index, be considered potential violations of the democratic embargo. As can be seen using this indicator excludes 34 of the 35 cases (97%) of potential violations. Note: The identified potential violations do not account for our subsequent investigation into the existence of aid, periods of joint democracy, or the existence of aid during periods of joint democracy.

Table A.4:   V-Dem Participatory Democracy Index

Incumbent-Patron(s)	Rebel Group	Dates	Incumbent Partipdem			Patron(s) Partipdem		
			3C	4C	5C	3C	4C	5C
France-United States	Viet Nam Doc Dong Min Hoi	1946-1954	✓	✓				
France-United States	FLN	1954-1968	✓	✓				
India-Pakistan	NNC	1956-1968						
Myanmar-India	KIO	1961-1992						
Sudan-Israel	Anya Nya	1963-1972						
UK-Ireland	PIRA/IRA	1971-1991	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Bangladesh-India	JSS/SB/Shanti Bahini	1975-1992						
El Salvador-Nicaragua	FMLN	1980-1991						
Nicaragua-US (and others)	FDN/Contras	1982-1990				✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	PLA	1982-1988						
Sudan-Israel	SPLM	1983-2004				✓	✓	
India-Pakistan	Sikh Insurgents	1983-1993						
Turkey-Greece	PKK/Kadek	1984-2011				✓	✓	✓
Peru-Nicaragua	MRTA	1989-1993						
India-Pakistan	Kashmir Insurgents	1989-2011						
India-Pakistan	Naxalites/PWG	1990-2004						
India-Pakistan	UFLA	1990-2009						
Senegal-Gambia	MFDC	1990-2003						
Turkey-Greece	Devrimci Sol	1991-1992				✓	✓	
India-Pakistan	MCC	1992-2004						
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	NSCN	1992-2000						
India-Pakistan	ATTF	1992-1993						
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	BDSF/NDFB	1992-2004						
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	UNLF	1994-2009						
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	NLFT	1995-2006						
Nepal-India	CPN-M/UPF	1996-2006						
India-Pakistan	ATTF	1997-1999						
Russia-Georgia	Republic of Chechnya	1999-2007						
Israel-Russia	PFLP	2001	✓	✓				
Thailand-Malaysia	Patani Insurgents	2003-2011						
Pakistan-India	BLA/Baluchistan Liberation Army	2004-2011						
Georgia-Russia	Republic of South Ossetia	2004						
India-Pakistan	CPI-Maoist	2005-2011						
Pakistan-United States, Israel, India	TTP	2008-2011				✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	GNLA	2009-2011						

V-Dem Deliberative Democracy Index

The "Deliberative Democracy" index (variable: *delibdem*), in the words of its creator, "focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. To make it a measure of not only the deliberative principle but also of democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account" (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Luehrmann, Marquardt, McMann, Paxton, Pemstein, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Cornell, et al., 2019: 40–41). As with the previous V-Dem indices, there are three ordinal indices: one with three categories (Autocratic, Electoral Authoritarian, and Minimally Democratic), one with four categories (Autocratic, Electoral Authoritarian, Minimally Democratic, and Democratic), and one with five categories (Closed Autocratic, Autocratic, Electoral Authoritarian, Minimally Democratic, and Democratic). In Table A.5, the 35 identified potential violations are listed. X's represent actors that achieved "Minimally Democratic" status for at least one year during the conflict. Where multiple patrons are listed, the score

for the highest-rated democracy is used. Those dyads highlighted <mark>YELLOW</mark> are those that would, by at least one measure in this index, be considered potential violations of the democratic embargo. As can be seen using this indicator excludes 31 of the 35 cases (89%) of potential violations. Note: The identified potential violations do not account for our subsequent investigation into the existence of aid, periods of joint democracy, or the existence of aid during periods of joint democracy.

Table A.5:   V-Dem Deliberative Democracy Index

Incumbent-Patron(s)	Rebel Group	Dates	Incumbent Delibdem			Patron(s) Delibdem		
			3C	4C	5C	3C	4C	5C
France-United States	Viet Nam Doc Dong Min Hoi	1946-1954	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	
France-United States	FLN	1954-1968	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔
India-Pakistan	NNC	1956-1968	✔	✔				
Myanmar-India	KIO	1961-1992				✔	✔	✔
Sudan-Israel	Anya Nya	1963-1972						
UK-Ireland	PIRA/IRA	1971-1991	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔
Bangladesh-India	JSS/SB/Shanti Bahini	1975-1992				✔	✔	✔
El Salvador-Nicaragua	FMLN	1980-1991				✔	✔	✔
Nicaragua-US (and others)	FDN/Contras	1982-1990				✔	✔	✔
India-Pakistan	PLA	1982-1988	✔	✔	✔			
Sudan-Israel	SPLM	1983-2004				✔	✔	✔
India-Pakistan	Sikh Insurgents	1983-1993	✔	✔	✔			
Turkey-Greece	PKK/Kadek	1984-2011	✔	✔		✔	✔	✔
Peru-Nicaragua	MRTA	1989-1993				✔	✔	✔
India-Pakistan	Kashmir Insurgents	1989-2011	✔	✔	✔			
India-Pakistan	Naxalites/PWG	1990-2004	✔	✔	✔			
India-Pakistan	UFLA	1990-2009	✔	✔	✔			
Senegal-Gambia	MFDC	1990-2003	✔	✔	✔			
Turkey-Greece	Devrimci Sol	1991-1992				✔	✔	✔
India-Pakistan	MCC	1992-2004	✔	✔	✔			
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	NSCN	1992-2000	✔	✔	✔			
India-Pakistan	ATTF	1992-1993	✔	✔	✔			
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	BDSF/NDFB	1992-2004	✔	✔	✔			
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	UNLF	1994-2009	✔	✔	✔			
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	NLFT	1995-2006	✔	✔	✔			
Nepal-India	CPN-M/UPF	1996-2006				✔	✔	✔
India-Pakistan	ATTF	1997-1999	✔	✔	✔			
Russia-Georgia	Republic of Chechnya	1999-2007						
Israel-Russia	PFLP	2001	✔	✔	✔			
Thailand-Malaysia	Patani Insurgents	2003-2011	✔	✔				
Pakistan-India	BLA/Baluchistan Liberation Army	2004-2011				✔	✔	✔
Georgia-Russia	Republic of South Ossetia	2004						
India-Pakistan	CPI-Maoist	2005-2011	✔	✔	✔			
Pakistan-United States, Israel, India	TTP	2008-2011				✔	✔	✔
India-Pakistan	GNLA	2009-2011	✔	✔	✔			

<u>V-Dem Egalitarian Democracy Index</u>

The "Egalitarian Democracy" index (variable: *egaldem*), in the words of its creator, seeks to assess the degree to which material and immaterial qualities affect the quality of political

participation, with egalitarian ideals "achieved when (1) rights and freedoms of individuals are protected equally across all social groups; (2) resources are distributed equally across all social groups; and (3) groups and individuals enjoy equal access to power. To make it a measure of egalitarian democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account" (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Luehrmann, Marquardt, McMann, Paxton, Pemstein, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Cornell, et al., 2019: 41). As with the previous V-Dem indices, there are three ordinal indices: one with three categories (Autocratic, Electoral Authoritarian, and Minimally Democratic), one with four categories (Autocratic, Electoral Authoritarian, Minimally Democratic, and Democratic), and one with five categories (Closed Autocratic, Autocratic, Electoral Authoritarian, Minimally Democratic, and Democratic). In Table A.6, the 35 identified potential violations are listed. X's represent actors that achieved "Minimally Democratic" status for at least one year during the conflict. Where multiple patrons are listed, the score for the highest-rated democracy is used. Those dyads highlighted <mark>YELLOW</mark> are those that would, by at least one measure in this index, be considered potential violations of the democratic embargo. As can be seen using this indicator excludes 34 of the 35 cases (97%) of potential violations. Note: The identified potential violations do not account for our subsequent investigation into the existence of aid, periods of joint democracy, or the existence of aid during periods of joint democracy.

Table A.6:   V-Dem Egalitarian Democracy Index

Incumbent-Patron(s)	Rebel Group	Dates	Incumbent Egaldem			Patron(s) Egaldem		
			3C	4C	5C	3C	4C	5C
France-United States	Viet Nam Doc Dong Min Hoi	1946-1954	✓	✓	✓			
France-United States	FLN	1954-1968	✓	✓	✓			
India-Pakistan	NNC	1956-1968						
Myanmar-India	KIO	1961-1992						
Sudan-Israel	Anya Nya	1963-1972				✓	✓	
UK-Ireland	PIRA/IRA	1971-1991	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bangladesh-India	JSS/SB/Shanti Bahini	1975-1992						
El Salvador-Nicaragua	FMLN	1980-1991						
Nicaragua-US (and others)	FDN/Contras	1982-1990				✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	PLA	1982-1988						
Sudan-Israel	SPLM	1983-2004				✓	✓	
India-Pakistan	Sikh Insurgents	1983-1993	✓	✓				
Turkey-Greece	PKK/Kadek	1984-2011				✓	✓	✓
Peru-Nicaragua	MRTA	1989-1993						
India-Pakistan	Kashmir Insurgents	1989-2011	✓	✓				
India-Pakistan	Naxalites/PWG	1990-2004	✓	✓				
India-Pakistan	UFLA	1990-2009	✓	✓				
Senegal-Gambia	MFDC	1990-2003	✓	✓				
Turkey-Greece	Devrimci Sol	1991-1992				✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	MCC	1992-2004	✓	✓				
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	NSCN	1992-2000	✓	✓				
India-Pakistan	ATTF	1992-1993	✓	✓				
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	BDSF/NDFB	1992-2004	✓	✓				
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	UNLF	1994-2009	✓	✓				
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	NLFT	1995-2006	✓	✓				
Nepal-India	CPN-M/UPF	1996-2006				✓	✓	
India-Pakistan	ATTF	1997-1999	✓	✓				

Russia-Georgia	Republic of Chechnya	1999-2007						
Israel-Russia	PFLP	2001	✓	✓				
Thailand-Malaysia	Patani Insurgents	2003-2011						
Pakistan-India	BLA/Baluchistan Liberation Army	2004-2011				✓	✓	
Georgia-Russia	Republic of South Ossetia	2004						
India-Pakistan	CPI-Maoist	2005-2011	✓	✓				
Pakistan-United States, Israel, India	TTP	2008-2011				✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	GNLA	2009-2011						

Freedom House Index

The Freedom House "Freedom in the World" Project evaluates the "electoral process, political pluralism and participation, the functioning of the government, freedom of expression and of belief, associational and organizational rights, the rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights" (Freedom House, n.d.). It then assigns scores, ranging from 7 (least free) to 1 (most free) along two dimensions for every state in the international system: "Political Rights" and "Civil Liberties." A composite score ("Status") is created using the two component indicators and is ordinal in nature: states are classified as "Free," "Partially Free," and "Not Free" (Puddington et al., 2018: 9). In Table A.7, the 35 identified potential violations are listed. X's represent actors that achieved "Free" status for at least one year during the conflict. Where multiple patrons are listed, the score for the most-free state is used. Those dyads highlighted YELLOW are those that would, by at least one measure in this index, be considered potential violations of the democratic embargo. As can be seen using this indicator excludes 31 of the 35 cases (89%) of potential violations. NOTES: The Freedom in the World Project scoring began in 1972, so all codings in Table A.7 reflect only those portions of the conflicts that occurred during or after that year. Additionally, as before, the identified potential violations do not account for our subsequent investigation into the existence of aid, periods of joint democracy, or the existence of aid during periods of joint democracy. NOTE: The identified potential violations do not account for our subsequent investigation into the existence of aid, periods of joint democracy, or the existence of aid during periods of joint democracy.

Table A.7:   Freedom House Index (1972—2011)

Incumbent-Patron(s)	Rebel Group	Dates	Incumbent			Patron(s)		
			PR	CL	S	PR	CL	S
France-United States	Viet Nam Doc Dong Min Hoi	1946-1954	--	--	--	--	--	--
France-United States	FLN	1954-1968	--	--	--	--	--	--
India-Pakistan	NNC	1956-1968	--	--	--	--	--	--
Myanmar-India (post-1972)	KIO	1961-1992	6	5	NF	2	2	F
Sudan-Israel (1972 only)	Anya Nya	1963-1972	6	6	NF	2	3	F
UK-Ireland (post-1972)	PIRA/IRA	1971-1991	1	1	F	1	1	F
Bangladesh-India	JSS/SB/Shanti Bahini	1975-1992	2	3	F	2	2	F
El Salvador-Nicaragua	FMLN	1980-1991	2	4	PF	3	3	PF
Nicaragua-US (and others)	FDN/Contras	1982-1990	3	3	PF	1	1	F
India-Pakistan	PLA	1982-1988	2	3	F	3	3	PF
Sudan-Israel	SPLM	1983-2004	4	5	PF	1	2	F
India-Pakistan	Sikh Insurgents	1983-1993	2	3	F	3	3	PF
Turkey-Greece	PKK/Kadek	1984-2011	2	4	PF	1	2	F
Peru-Nicaragua	MRTA	1989-1993	2	4	PF	3	3	PF

13

India-Pakistan	Kashmir Insurgents	1989-2011	2	3	F	3	3	PF
India-Pakistan	Naxalites/PWG	1990-2004	2	3	F	3	4	PF
India-Pakistan	UFLA	1990-2009	2	3	F	3	4	PF
Senegal-Gambia	MFDC	1990-2003	2	3	F	2	2	F
Turkey-Greece	Devrimci Sol	1991-1992	2	4	PF	1	2	F
India-Pakistan	MCC	1992-2004	2	3	F	3	5	PF
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	NSCN	1992-2000	2	3	F	2	3	F
India-Pakistan	ATTF	1992-1993	2	3	F	3	5	PF
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	BDSF/NDFB	1992-2004	2	3	F	3	5	PF
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	UNLF	1994-2009	2	3	F	2	4	PF
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	NLFT	1995-2006	2	3	F	3	5	PF
Nepal-India	CPN-M/UPF	1996-2006	3	4	PF	2	3	F
India-Pakistan	ATTF	1997-1999	2	3	F	4	5	PF
Russia-Georgia	Republic of Chechnya	1999-2007	4	5	PF	3	3	PF
Israel-Russia	PFLP	2001	1	3	F	5	5	PF
Thailand-Malaysia	Patani Insurgents	2003-2011	2	3	F	4	4	PF
Pakistan-India	BLA/Baluchistan Liberation Army	2004-2011	4	5	PF	2	3	F
Georgia-Russia	Republic of South Ossetia	2004	3	4	PF	6	5	NF
India-Pakistan	CPI-Maoist	2005-2011	2	3	F	4	5	PF
Pakistan-United States, Israel, India	TTP	2008-2011	4	5	PF	1	1	F
India-Pakistan	GNLA	2009-2011	2	3	F	4	5	PF

APPENDIX B: **Evidence for the Democratic Embargo**

In this appendix, we report the general descriptive statistics and the bivariate analysis underlying the discussion of the democratic embargo in the main text. Collectively, the data presented in this appendix offers strong support for the existence of the democratic embargo, confirming and extending the findings of existing scholarship.

Tables B.1-B.3 report the number of incumbent states of different regime types in the dataset, the number of incumbent states of different regime types fighting rebels who received third-party support in the dataset, and the number of patrons of different regime types in the dataset. The figures using both the +6 and +7 Polity thresholds for democracy are displayed.

Table B.1:   Incumbent States, by Regime Type

	Polity > 5	Polity > 6
Never Democratic	385	415
Democratic at some point during, but not throughout, the conflict-dyad period	31	22
Democratic throughout the conflict-dyad period	118	97
Total	534	534

Table B.2:   Incumbent States Fighting Rebels Who Received Support, by Regime Type

	Polity > 5	Polity > 6
Never Democratic	242/385 63%	261/415 63%
Democratic at some point during, but not throughout, the conflict-dyad period	22/31 71%	17/22 77%
Democratic throughout the conflict-dyad period	60/118 51%	46/97 47%
Total	324/534	324/534

Table B.3:   States Supporting Rebels, by Regime Type

	Polity > 5	Polity > 6
Never Democratic	204	216
Democratic at some point during, but not throughout, the conflict-dyad period	27	21
Democratic throughout the conflict-dyad period	92	86
Total	323*	323*

> * Japan is coded as supporting the Indonesian People's Army in its fight against the Netherlands between 1945 and 1949, when it was under United States occupation and, as such, lacked a Polity coding.

Table B.4 reports a bivariate analysis of incumbent and patron regime types using the +6 Polity threshold for democracy. Table B.5 reports the same analysis using the +7 Polity threshold for democracy. Potential violations of the democratic embargo are highlighted in the grey-shaded cells. Using the +6 Polity threshold, there are only 35 potential exceptions to the democratic embargo; using the +7 Polity threshold, there are only 22 potential exceptions. Considering "pure" cases of violation, where both the incumbent and patron were democratic throughout the conflict, there are only 8 potential exceptions to the democratic embargo when using the +6 Polity threshold, and 5 when using the +7 Polity threshold.

These tables use index variables created from our previously described descriptive variables. They are:

side_a_dem6_scale: 0 if *side_a_dem6_any* is 0
                           1 if *side_a_dem6_any* is 1 and *side_a_dem6_throughout* is 0
                           2 if *side_a_dem6_throughout* is 1

side_a_dem7_scale: 0 if *side_a_dem7_any* is 0
                           1 if *side_a_dem7_any* is 1 and *side_a_dem7_throughout* is 0
                           2 if *side_a_dem7_throughout* is 1

side_b_supp_dem6_scale: 0 if *side_b_supp_dem6_any* is 0
                           1 if *side_b_supp_dem6_any* is 1 *side_b_supp_dem6_throughout* is 0
                           2 if *side_b_supp_dem6_throughout* is 1

side_b_supp_dem7_scale: 0 if *side_b_supp_dem7_any* is 0
                           1 if *side_b_supp_dem7_any* is 1 & *side_b_supp_dem7_throughout* is 0
                           2 if *side_b_supp_dem7_throughout* is 1

All statistics and tests reported exclude coups.

Table B.4:   Rebel Patronage and Regime Type (+6 Polity Threshold)

		Patron			
		Never Democratic	Democratic for Some Period	Democratic Throughout	**Total**
Incumbent	Never Democratic	158	9	75	**237**
	Democratic for Some Period	8	5	9	**27**
	Democratic Throughout	38	13	8	**59**
	Total	**204**	**27**	**92**	**323**

$\chi^2 = 33.895$, p < 0.000

16

Table B.5:   Rebel Patronage and Regime Type (+7 Polity Threshold)

		Patron			
		Never Democratic	Democratic for Some Period	Democratic Throughout	**Total**
Incumbent	Never Democratic	176	8	77	**261**
	Democratic for Some Period	12	1	4	**17**
	Democratic Throughout	28	12	5	**45**
	Total	**216**	**21**	**86**	**323**

$\chi^2 = 38.029$, p < 0.000

The results in Tables B.4 and B.5 confirm existing scholarship suggesting that the democratic embargo exists. It might be asked, however, whether the apparent support for the democratic embargo is not simply a function of the relatively small number of democracies in the international system for most of the period examined. Nondemocracies outnumbered democracies for 55 of the 67 years between 1945 and 2011, sometimes by a ratio of 3:1, and it may simply be that, because they were so rare, democracies were less likely to serve as patrons overall.

Although plausible, there is no reason to think that the democratic embargo is a function of the number of democracies present in the international system in any given year. Normalizing democracies' patronage of rebels by the number of democratic regimes in the system (Polity > +6) reveals that democracies have in fact supported rebels at a rate very similar to that of nondemocracies. Figure B.1 depicts democratic and nondemocratic patronage of rebels between 1945 and 2011, normalized by the number of each regime type in the system. On average, in any given year, 3.80% of democracies aided rebels while 3.81% of nondemocracies did so. In absolute numbers, a greater percentage of democracies than nondemocracies aided rebels in 28 years, a greater percentage of nondemocracies than democracies aided rebels in 33 years, the same percentage of democracies and nondemocracies aided rebels in four years, and there were no new rebellion onsets in two years. Put differently, after accounting for the number of democracies present in the international system, there is no evidence that such regimes were less likely to aid rebels fighting abroad than nondemocracies.

Figure B.1: **Rebel Aid by Regime Type 1945-2011, Normalized by Number of Democracies and Nondemocracies in the International System**

Though democracies were, per capita, just as common patrons of rebels as nondemocracies, they were nevertheless discriminating. Figure B.2 depicts the percentage of democracies in the system (Polity > +6) that provided aid to rebels fighting democracies and nondemocracies in any given year between 1945 and 2011. On average, 1.02% democracies in the system aided rebels fighting other democracies while 2.78% of democracies in the system aided rebels fighting nondemocracies. This imbalance is reinforced when looking at the individual years: the percentage of democracies in the system aiding rebels fighting nondemocracies was greater than the percentage of democracies in the system aiding rebels fighting other democracies in 27 years; the reverse was true in only 10 years. In 28 years, the percentage of democracies in the system aiding rebels fighting nondemocracies and rebels fighting democracies was equal; in two years, there were no new rebellion onsets. After accounting for the number of democracies in the system, it becomes clear that such regimes do in fact avoid aiding rebels fighting other democracies.

Figure B.2: **Democratic Aid to Rebels by Regime Type, 1945-2011, Normalized by Number of Democracies in the International System**

This democratic discrimination in the kinds of rebels supported holds even when further normalizing patronage by the number of opportunities elected regimes had to support rebellions in different types of states. For illustrative purposes, consider the year 1982. In that year, there were 43 democracies (Polity > +6) in the international system, 11 rebellion onsets (4 democratic incumbents, 7 nondemocratic incumbents), and 4 democratic patrons (2 instances of aid given to rebels fighting democracies, 2 instances of aid given to rebels fighting nondemocracies). Together, these data points indicate that, in 1982, 1.16% of democracies aided rebels fighting other democracies ((2/43)/4) and 0.66% of democracies aided rebels fighting nondemocracies ((2/43)/7). Figure B.3 depicts democratic patronage to rebels fighting different regime types, normalized by both the number of democracies and the number of opportunities in each year between 1945 and 2011. In such terms, in any given year, 0.48% democracies in the system aided rebels fighting other democracies while 0.52% of democracies in the system aided rebels fighting nondemocracies. This imbalance is also evident when looking at the individual years: the percentage of democracies in the system aiding rebels fighting nondemocracies was greater than the percentage of democracies in the system aiding rebels fighting other democracies in 23 years when normalized by the number of opportunities available to provide aid; the reverse was true in 21 years. In 21 other years, the percentage of democracies in the system aiding rebels fighting nondemocracies and rebels fighting democracies, normalized by opportunities, was equal; in 2 years, there were no new rebellion onsets.

Figure B.3: Democratic Aid to Rebels by Regime Type, 1945-2011, Normalized by Number of Democracies in the International System and Opportunities for Patronage


——————— % Dems Aiding Rebels Fighting Democracies/Opportunities

⋯⋯⋯⋯⋯ % Dems Aiding Rebels Fighting Nondemocracies/Opportunities

Table B.6 presents the yearly data underpinning Figures B.1 – B.3. Reported are figures for the number of democracies in in the international system; the number of rebellion onsets and percentage of which featured democratic incumbents; the number of patronage instances generally and the percentage of those instances that featured democratic patrons; and the number of instances in which support was given to rebels fighting democracies and the percentage of those instances that featured democratic patrons. Democracies are states scored +6 or higher on the Polity scale.

Table B.6: Democratic Presence and Patronage Over Time

| Year | Number of States in the System | | | Rebellion Onsets | | Instances of Patronage | | Instances of Patronage vs. Democratic Incumbents | |
	Dems	Nondems	% Dem	Onsets	% Dem Incumbents	Patrons	% Dem Patrons	Counter-Dem Patrons	% Dem Counter-Dem Patrons
1945	22	50	30.6%	2	50.0%	1	0.0%	0	0.0%
1946	24	48	33.3%	13	38.5%	9	33.3%	5	20.0%
1947	23	50	31.5%	4	50.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
1948	26	52	33.3%	9	88.9%	1	0.0%	1	0.0%
1949	24	55	30.4%	4	100.0%	1	0.0%	1	0.0%
1950	25	55	31.3%	4	50.0%	2	100.0%	0	0.0%

20

1951	25	56	30.9%	—	—	—	—	—	—
1952	26	55	32.1%	2	100.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
1953	26	56	31.7%	4	75.0%	1	0.0%	1	0.0%
1954	26	58	31.0%	1	100.0%	1	100.0%	1	100.0%
1955	26	59	30.6%	4	75.0%	2	0.0%	1	0.0%
1956	29	58	33.3%	3	33.3%	2	100.0%	1	100.0%
1957	31	57	35.2%	5	80.0%	3	0.0%	2	0.0%
1958	30	59	33.7%	6	33.3%	4	50.0%	0	0.0%
1959	32	60	34.8%	4	75.0%	2	50.0%	1	0.0%
1960	36	75	32.4%	6	16.7%	3	33.3%	1	0.0%
1961	34	80	29.8%	6	16.7%	6	83.3%	1	100.0%
1962	36	82	30.5%	3	33.3%	2	50.0%	1	0.0%
1963	34	86	28.3%	4	50.0%	4	25.0%	1	100.0%
1964	35	87	28.7%	10	30.0%	6	0.0%	2	0.0%
1965	37	86	30.1%	7	28.6%	1	0.0%	1	0.0%
1966	37	89	29.4%	7	28.6%	6	0.0%	1	0.0%
1967	36	91	28.3%	5	0.0%	4	25.0%	0	0.0%
1968	38	92	29.2%	—	—	—	—	—	—
1969	36	94	27.7%	5	40.0%	3	0.0%	1	0.0%
1970	36	96	27.3%	4	0.0%	2	0.0%	0	0.0%
1971	34	101	25.2%	5	20.0%	4	50.0%	1	100.0%
1972	35	101	25.7%	3	0.0%	2	0.0%	0	0.0%
1973	36	100	26.5%	5	0.0%	3	66.7%	0	0.0%
1974	35	102	25.5%	5	60.0%	2	0.0%	1	0.0%
1975	36	107	25.2%	13	15.4%	11	54.5%	2	50.0%
1976	36	107	25.2%	10	0.0%	6	33.3%	0	0.0%
1977	35	108	24.5%	9	0.0%	7	28.6%	0	0.0%
1978	38	106	26.4%	4	75.0%	3	0.0%	2	0.0%
1979	44	100	30.6%	17	5.9%	15	20.0%	0	0.0%
1980	43	101	29.9%	8	12.5%	7	85.7%	1	100.0%
1981	42	102	29.2%	8	12.5%	6	33.3%	1	0.0%
1982	43	101	29.9%	11	36.4%	8	50.0%	2	100.0%
1983	45	99	31.3%	8	25.0%	5	40.0%	2	100.0%
1984	45	99	31.3%	10	30.0%	6	66.7%	2	50.0%
1985	46	98	31.9%	6	16.7%	3	66.7%	0	0.0%
1986	47	97	32.6%	5	0.0%	2	50.0%	0	0.0%
1987	47	97	32.6%	4	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
1988	48	96	33.3%	3	0.0%	3	100.0%	0	0.0%
1989	50	94	34.7%	24	20.8%	18	44.4%	4	50.0%
1990	59	88	40.1%	20	30.0%	11	45.5%	5	60.0%
1991	68	93	42.2%	22	18.2%	14	42.9%	2	50.0%
1992	76	85	47.2%	22	22.7%	14	50.0%	5	80.0%
1993	78	86	47.6%	14	14.3%	7	28.6%	1	0.0%
1994	79	84	48.5%	11	45.5%	7	14.3%	2	50.0%
1995	78	85	47.9%	5	80.0%	3	66.7%	2	50.0%
1996	79	84	48.5%	14	14.3%	8	62.5%	1	100.0%
1997	80	83	49.1%	21	14.3%	15	26.7%	2	50.0%
1998	79	84	48.5%	9	11.1%	5	40.0%	0	0.0%
1999	80	83	49.1%	6	33.3%	4	25.0%	1	100.0%
2000	82	81	50.3%	6	33.3%	2	0.0%	1	0.0%
2001	86	77	52.8%	7	71.4%	5	20.0%	3	33.3%
2002	88	76	53.7%	8	25.0%	6	0.0%	0	0.0%
2003	89	75	54.3%	7	28.6%	5	40.0%	1	100.0%
2004	94	70	57.3%	16	31.3%	8	50.0%	3	66.7%
2005	96	68	58.5%	9	33.3%	4	50.0%	1	100.0%

2006	98	68	59.0%	12	16.7%	8	12.5%	1	0.0%
2007	95	70	57.6%	9	44.4%	3	0.0%	2	0.0%
2008	98	68	59.0%	13	46.2%	8	37.5%	3	33.3%
2009	95	71	57.2%	9	22.2%	4	25.0%	1	100.0%
2010	95	71	57.2%	5	0.0%	1	0.0%	0	0.0%
2011	99	69	58.9%	9	0.0%	3	33.3%	0	0.0%

APPENDIX C: Case Summaries of Potential Violations of the Democratic Embargo

In this appendix, we present summaries of our research into the 35 potential violations of the democratic embargo identified through the bivariate analysis reported in Appendix B (Table B.4) and discussed in the main text (Table 2). In researching each case, we sought to answer five questions:

1. Is there reliable evidence of any support provided by the alleged patron to rebels fighting the incumbent?
2. If yes, when was that support provided?
3. Does any period of support overlap with periods of joint incumbent-patron democracy?
4. Given available evidence, how confident are we in the fact of support and its timing?
5. In cases of patronage during periods of joint democracy, did the leaders of the supporting state view the incumbent state as a rival?

For each case, we present a short summary of the dyad's relevant characteristics, a final coding assessment, and a list of key sources used to arrive at our conclusions.

   I.   France-United States, Viet Minh, 1946-1954

            During World War II, Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh received aid from the U.S. Office of Strategic Services to fight the Japanese. The United States, however, did not aid the Viet Minh against France, a key U.S. ally. In 1945, Washington announced it would not oppose French reassertion of control in its colony and transported French forces to Saigon. By 1954, in the context of the Cold War, Washington funded about 75% of the cost of the French war effort.

            Coding:

                No Democratic Patronage; No Violation of the Democratic Embargo

            Key Source(s):

                Logevall, Frederik, *Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 2013)
                Willbanks, James H., ed., *Vietnam War: A Topical Exploration and Primary Source Collection* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2018)

   II.   France-United States, Algeria, FLN, 1954-1962

            In 1954, the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) began an armed campaign for Algerian independence from France. Washington initially backed the French campaign but later pressed Paris to make concessions and agree a negotiated solution. The United States, however, did not directly aid the FLN because France was a key NATO ally. FLN representatives worked in the United States, sought to shape U.S. public opinion, met officials, and raised several million dollars from private Americans. Washington said it

constitutionally could not stop these activities, but did not extend official imprimatur to the effort.

Coding:

No Democratic Patronage; No Violation of the Democratic Embargo

Key Source(s):

Horne, Alistair, *A Savage War of Peace* (New York: New York Review of Books, 1977)
Schmidt, Elizabeth, *Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013)
Wall, Irwin M., *France, the United States, and the Algerian War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001)
Weisburd, A. Mark, *Use of Force: The Practice of States Since World War II* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997)

III.   India-Pakistan, NNC, 1956-1968

The Naga National Council advocated for the secession of the Naga territory from India. When peaceful diplomatic efforts failed, the group took up arms to force the issue. The Pakistani security forces backed Naga rebels in the 1950s by providing arms and supplies, organizing a training camp in the Sylhet area of East Pakistan, providing trainers from Pakistan's Special Services Group (SSG), and helping militants escape from India. India was democratic throughout whereas Pakistan was democratic between February 1956 and October 1958. The leaders of each state viewed the other as a mortal rival.

Coding:

Democratic Patronage; Violation of the Democratic Embargo; Leadership Recognized Rivalry

Key Source(s):

Anand, V.K., *Conflict in Nagaland: A Study of Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency* (Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1980)
Lintner, Bertil, *Great Game East: India, China, and the Struggle for Asia's Most Volatile Frontier* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015)
Sirrs, Owen L., *Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: Covert Action and Internal Operations.* (New York: Routledge, 2016)

IV.   Myanmar-India, KIO, 1961-1992

The Kachin Independence Organization began an armed rebellion in Myanmar in 1961. It was aided by China but there is no evidence of aid from India during the period of Myanmar's democracy (1961-1962). Chinese aid led to closer ties between India and the

Myanmar regime. There are reports of Indian aid to the KIO in the 1980s and 1990s but Myanmar was not democratic during this period.

Coding:

Democratic Patronage, but No Violation of the Democratic Embargo

Key Source(s):

Bhaumik, Subir, *Insurgent Crossfire: North-East India* (New Delhi: Lancer, 2008)
Brewster, David, *India's Ocean: The Story of India's Bid for Regional Leadership* (London: Routledge, 2014)
Verma, Bahrat, ed., *Indian Defense Review*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (April-June 2001)

V. Sudan-Israel, Anya Nya, 1963-1972

Anya Nya was a southern Sudanese rebel army fighting for secession. Israel provided aid to rebels (including captured booty from the 1967 Six-Day War) between 1969 and 1971, but reportedly only began its patronage after Sudan transitioned to non-democracy in May 1969.

Coding:

Democratic Patronage, but No Violation of the Democratic Embargo

Key Source(s):

Beit-Hallahmi, Benjamin, *The Israeli Connection: Whom Israel Arms and Why* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988)
Gidron, Yotam, "'One People, One Struggle': Anya-Nya propaganda and the Israeli Mossad in Southern Sudan, 1969–1971," *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (July 2018)
Mordechai Nisan, *Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression* (London: McFarland, 2015)

VI. UK-Ireland, PIRA/IRA, 1971-1991

The IRA, and later the PIRA, fought to unify the island of Ireland under Dublin's control. The Irish state sometimes gave rhetorical encouragement to the broader Republican cause in Northern Ireland. In 1969, Dublin sought UN peacekeepers in the North and deployed army field hospitals to the border. The British wanted Dublin to take a tougher stance toward IRA activities in the Republic, such as training and acquiring weapons. But Dublin was extremely wary about involvement in the crisis and did not aid the IRA. Dublin rejected violence and opposed the IRA's Marxist-inspired ideology. Michael Kennedy concluded, "there was no support for the IRA in the Dublin administration." Indeed, in

1973 Ireland intercepted a Libyan arms shipment to the IRA onboard the *Claudia*, and in 1984, it intercepted the *Marita Ann*, carrying weapons from U.S. supporters.

Coding:

No Democratic Patronage; No Violation of the Democratic Embargo

Key Source(s):

Dillon, Martin, *The Dirty War* (New York: Routledge, 1999)
Dingley, James *The IRA: The Irish Republican Army* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2012)
Kennedy, Michael, *Division and Consensus: The Politics of Cross-Border Relations in Ireland, 1925-1969* (Dublin: IPA, 2000)
Williamson, Daniel C., *Anglo-Irish Relations in the Early Troubles: 1969-1972* (London: Bloomsbury, 2016)

VII.   Bangladesh-India, JSS/SB/Shanti Bahini, 1975-1992

The rebellion by Shanti Bahini is part of an insurrection by local tribes aiming to preserve tribal lands in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, which began in the 1970s. In response to Bangladeshi aid to rebels in India's northeast, India began half-hearted assistance to rebels, which declined during the mid-to-late 1980s. Aid tailed off before Bangladesh's transition to democracy in 1991, with the election of Khaleda Zia as prime minister, even though the conflict itself continued.

Coding:

Democratic Patronage; No Violation of the Democratic Embargo

Key Source(s):

Jacques, Kathryn, *Bangladesh, India and Pakistan: International Relations and Regional Tensions in South Asia* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000)
Ray, Jayanta Kumar, *India's Foreign Relations, 1947-2007* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2011)

VIII.   El Salvador-Nicaragua, FMLN, 1980-1991

The FMLN formed in 1980 when five separate leftist groups consolidated in El Salvador (democratic from June 1984) to pool resources and military capabilities. Nicaraguan aid to the rebels persisted throughout the 1980s, but ceased when Nicaragua became democratic in 1990 following the election of Violeta Chamorro.

Coding:

Democratic Patronage; No Violation of the Democratic Embargo

Key Source(s):

    Anderson, Sean K., with Stephen Sloan, *Historical Dictionary of Terrorism*, third edition (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2009)

IX.   <u>Nicaragua-United States and Several Others, FDN/Contras, 1982-1990</u>

The FDN formed in 1981 to fight the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. As an anti-communist force, it attracted assistance from the United States and other Western and Western-allied democracies during the 1980s. Aid from the United States and other countries ceased, however, when Nicaragua became democratic in 1990 following the election of Violeta Chamorro. Other democratic patrons included Honduras, Costa Rica, South Korea, Israel, Argentina, and Venezuela.

Coding:

    Democratic Patronage; No Violation of the Democratic Embargo

Key Source(s):

    Bacchus, William I. 1997. *The Price of American Foreign Policy: Congress, the Executive, and International Affairs Funding* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press)

X.   <u>India-Pakistan, PLA, 1982-1988</u>

The People's Liberation Army is a Maoist armed group founded in 1978, which seeks a socialist state in northeastern India. Pakistan initially backed rebels in northeast India from East Pakistan but this aid became more difficult following the 1971 war. Though the conflict is coded by NSA as ending in 1988, NAGs notes that it continues to simmer to the present. Pakistani aid continued beyond the 1980s. In late 1990, the PLA contacted Pakistan to seek support. Captured PLA documents showed that Pakistan agreed to provide assistance via Myanmar, including training insurgents and providing weaponry. India was democratic throughout the period while Pakistan was democratic from November 1988 to July 1999 and again in 2010. Indian and Pakistani leadership recognized the other as a mortal rival throughout the conflict.

Coding:

    Democratic Patronage; Violation of the Democratic Embargo; Leadership Recognized Rivalry

Key Source(s):

Leitner, Richard J. and Peter M. Leitner, eds., *Unheeded Warnings: The Lost Reports of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare*, Vol. 1, Islamic Terrorism and the West (Washington D.C.: Crossbow, 2007)

XI.   Sudan-Israel, SPLM, 1983-2004

Israel backed rebels in South Sudan in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Israeli relations with Sudan were peaceful from the 1972 peace deal to 1985. The coup in Sudan in 1985 ended this period of rapprochement and the new Sudanese military regime aligned more closely with Libya and Ethiopia. Israel subsequently strengthened relations with the SPLM rebels. During the period of Sudanese democracy, from 1986-1989, Israel reportedly provided weapons to the SPLA, the military wing of the SPLM, including heavy artillery and technical advisers. The aid was provided as part of Israel's broader rivalry with the Arab world.

Coding:

  Democratic Patronage; Violation of the Democratic Embargo; Leadership
    Recognized Rivalry

Key Source(s):

  Beit-Hallahmi, Benjamin, *The Israeli Connection: Whom Israel Arms and Why* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988)
  Holt, P.M. and M.W. Daly, *A History of the Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day* (New York: Routledge 2014)
  Nisan, Mordechai, *Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression* (London: McFarland, 2015)
  Pateman, Roy, "Intelligence Operations in the Horn of Africa," in John Sorenson, ed., *Disaster and Development in the Horn of Africa* (New York: St. Martin's 1995)
  Warburg, Gabriel, *Islam, Sectarianism, and Politics in Sudan Since the Mahdiyya* (Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 2003)

XII.   India-Pakistan, Sikh insurgents, 1983-1993

In the late 1970s, a secessionist movement pushing for Sikh autonomy in Punjab began. At least one of the leaders of the various movements, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, was reportedly trained by Pakistan's ISI. In the late 1980s, Pakistan stepped up its training and military support for Sikh insurgents, including providing rifles and anti-aircraft guns, as well as safe houses in Lahore. Pakistan transitioned to democracy in November 1988 and continued providing this assistance while it was democratic. Indian and Pakistani leaders each viewed the other state as a mortal rival throughout the conflict.

Coding:

Democratic Patronage; Violation of the Democratic Embargo; Leadership Recognized Rivalry

Key Source(s):

Belgin San-Akca, *States in Disguise: Causes of State Support for Rebel Groups* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016)

Leitner, Richard J. and Peter M. Leitner, eds., *Unheeded Warnings: The Lost Reports of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare*, Vol. 1, Islamic Terrorism and the West (Washington D.C.: Crossbow, 2007)

Office of the Secretary of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1990)

XIII.   Turkey-Greece, PKK/Kadek, 1984-2011

In 1999, Turkey accused Greece of backing the PKK, the Kurdistan Workers' Party. Greece denied claims of aid but accepted that private individuals may have occasionally supported the PKK. Evidence of support is extremely ambiguous. The PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured in Kenya carrying a Greek Cypriot passport. After his capture, Ocalan reportedly claimed he received Greek backing ("they even gave us arms and rockets") but this is not confirmed. There was some Greek moral support, for example, Greek politicians admitted meeting with Ocalan. Any Greek aid ended in 1999 with reconciliation and joint promises to fight terrorism. Both Turkey and Greece were democratic throughout the conflict period. The two states are strategic rivals over Cyprus, which Turkey invaded in 1974.

Coding:

Potential Democratic Patronage; Potential Violation of the Democratic Embargo; Leadership Recognized Rivalry

Key Source(s):

Mincheva, Lyubov Grigorova and Ted Robert Gurr, *Crime-Terror Alliances and the State: Ethnonationalist and Islamist Challenges to Regional Security* (New York: Routledge, 2013)

XIV.   Peru-Nicaragua, MRTA, 1989-1993

The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (*MRTA*) was a Guevarist insurgency that began in 1984, inspired by revolutions in Nicaragua and Cuba. Peru had close ties to the USSR from 1968-1990 but was anti-communist domestically. The Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism,* 1989, says the MRTA "may have received material from Nicaragua" via insurgents in Ecuador. But the following year (by which point there is joint democracy) the *Patterns of Global Terrorism* does not list Nicaragua as a patron. The rebels

"received training in Cuba. May have ties to Libya." Any aid provided was apparently shut off when Nicaragua transitioned to democracy.

Coding:

No Democratic Patronage; No Violation of the Democratic Embargo

Key Source(s):

Office of the Secretary of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1990)

Office of the Secretary of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1991)

Scalabrino, Michelangelo, "Fighting Against International Terrorism: The Latin American Response," in Andrea Bianchi, ed., *Enforcing International Law Norms Against Terrorism* (Portland, OR: Hart, 2004)

XV.   India-Pakistan, Kashmir Insurgents, 1989-2011

Since the 1980s, Pakistan provided extensive training, arms and munitions and financial support for militant groups operating in Kashmir for a variety of causes - from Kashmiri independence (Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front) to Kashmir's merger into Pakistan (Hizbul Mujahideen, Ikhwan ul-Muslimeen, Muslim Janbaz Force) to Islamic jihadism (Lashkar-e-Taiba or LeT). The aid included weapons, training, financial support, and recruiting fighters. Pakistan funneled aid to militants through a variety of government institutions, NGOs, and businesses. India was democratic throughout, while Pakistan was democratic between 1988 and 1999, and again after 2010. Indian and Pakistani leaders viewed the other state as a mortal rival.

Coding:

Democratic Patronage; Violation of the Democratic Embargo; Leadership Recognized Rivalry

Key Source(s):

Behera, Navnita Chadha, *Demystifying Kashmir* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2006)

Byman, Daniel, *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005)

Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001)

Haqqani, Husain, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005)

Kapur, S. Paul and Sumit Ganguly, "The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South Asia," *International Security* Vol. 37, No. 1 (2012)

Murphy, Eamon, *The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots of Extremism* (New York: Routledge, 2013)

Staniland, Paul, *Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014)

XVI.   India-Pakistan, Naxalites/PWG, 1990-2004

Naxalites are leftist communist rebels that originated in West Bengal but have since expanded their presence and reach. India claims that Pakistani provided aid to Naxalite rebels during the 1990s, when both states were democratic. Information on Pakistani assistance in this case is limited, although Stratfor described a "very limited Pakistani-Naxalite relationship" where Pakistan sold weaponry through third-party sources and provided some liaison and coordination. Indian and Pakistani leaders each viewed the other state as a mortal rival.

Coding:

Democratic Patronage; Violation of the Democratic Embargo; Leadership Recognized Rivalry

Key Source(s):

West, Ben "Pakistan and the Naxalite Movement in India." *STRATFOR*, November 18, 2010. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/pakistan-and-naxalite-movement-india

XVII.   India-Pakistan and Bangladesh, UFLA, 1990-2009

The ULFA, a rebel group fighting for independence for Assam, established contacts with the ISI and Afghan Mujahideen in Pakistan, and the Bangladesh Field Intelligence in Dhaka, in the early 1990s. Pakistan supported the ULFA to force India to redeploy forces to Assam, thus weakening Indian defenses in Kashmir. ULFA weaponry was obtained from Pakistan and through contacts in Bangladesh. By 1994, it was reported that an estimated 200 ULFA militants were receiving training from Pakistan's ISI in camps in Afghanistan. India and Pakistan were both democratic throughout the 1990s, and leaders in each state viewed the other as a mortal rival.

Coding:

Democratic Patronage; Violation of the Democratic Embargo; Leadership Recognized Rivalry

Key Source(s):

Lintner, Bertil, *Great Game East: India, China, and the Struggle for Asia's Most Volatile Frontier* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015)
Saikia, Jaideep, "The ISI Reaches East: Anatomy of a Conspiracy," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* Vol. 25, No. 3 (2002)

XVIII. <u>Senegal-Gambia, MFDC, 1990-2003</u>

MFDC, or Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance, agitated for independence from Senegal for decades prior to the onset of sustained violence. Casamance, a region of Senegal largely cut off from the rest of the country and bordered by Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, is the territory over which the rebel group and state are fighting. MFDC, exploiting its geographic separation from the Senegalese capital and proximity to neighbors, has used territories in Gambia and Guinea-Bissau for sanctuary. Gambia has served as a source of arms for the rebels, while simultaneously acting to serve as a mediator between the government and rebels. Toward the end of the noted conflict period, Gambia cut off arms flows into Casamance. Crucially, Senegal and Gambia were never jointly democratic. Using Polity indicators, Gambia was democratic until July 1994 while Senegal was not democratic until March 2000. By the time Senegal became democratic, Gambia had already begun to wind down, or cut off, aid to MFDC.

Coding:

   Democratic Patronage; No Violation of the Democratic Embargo

Key Source(s):

   Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country Report: Senegal, The Gambia, Mauritania,"
      (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2000)
   Evans, Martin, "Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance
      (MFDC)," Chatham House Briefing Paper 04/02 (December, 2004)

XIX. <u>Turkey-Greece, Devrimci Sol, 1991-1992</u>

Devrimci Sol, or Dev Sol, is a revolutionary leftist group operating in Turkey since the 1970s. The U.S. Department of State, in *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1993*, reports that it: "Began new campaign against foreign interests in 1990. Protesting Gulf war, claimed assassination of two US military contractors, attempted assassination of a US Air Force officer. Launched rockets at US Consulate in Istanbul in April and July 1992." Assessment of external aid does not mention Greece: "Possible training support from radical Palestinians." Another source says external aid "unknown. Raises funds in western Europe. Finances its activities chiefly through armed robberies and extortion." Dev Sol is an unlikely recipient of aid from Greece, given its virulently anti-NATO positions.

Coding:

   No Democratic Patronage; No Violation of the Democratic Embargo

Key Source(s):

Office of the Secretary of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1993* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1994)

Piszkiewicz, Dennis, *Terrorism's War with America: A History* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003)

XX. India-Pakistan, MCC, 1992-2004

The Maoist Communist Centre is a communist rebel group operating in India and is loosely connected with other Naxalite movements. Patterns of aid mirror those of other Naxalite groups (see Appendix C, XVI, above). Support is limited. Pakistan reportedly provided arms sales through third parties and offered a degree of coordination. Both India and Pakistan were democratic throughout the 1990s and viewed each other as mortal rivals.

Coding:

Democratic Patronage; Violation of the Democratic Embargo; Leadership Recognized Rivalry

Key Source(s):

West, Ben "Pakistan and the Naxalite Movement in India." *STRATFOR*, November 18, 2010. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/pakistan-and-naxalite-movement-india

XXI. India-Pakistan and Bangladesh, NSCN, 1992-2000

The National Socialist Council of Nagaland is a nationalist rebel group fighting to establish an independent Naga homeland in northeast India. Saikia reports that the Pakistani ISI operated training camps for NSCN and other northeastern militant groups on Bangladeshi soil. This assistance came when both states were democratic and viewed one another as mortal rivals.

Coding:

Democratic Patronage; Violation of the Democratic Embargo; Leadership Recognized Rivalry

Key Source(s):

Bhaumik, Subir, *Insurgent Crossfire: North-East India* (New Delhi: Lancer, 2008)

Jamwal, N.S., "Border Management: Dilemma of Guarding the India-Bangladesh Border," *Strategic Analysis* Vol. 28, No. 1 (2004).

Rich, Paul B. and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency* (New York: Routledge, 2012)

Saikia, Jaideep, "The ISI Reaches East: Anatomy of a Conspiracy," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* Vol. 25, No. 3 (2000)

San-Akca, Belgin, *States in Disguise: Causes of State Support for Rebel Groups* (New York: Oxford, 2016)

XXII.   India-Pakistan, ATTF, 1992-1993

The All Tripura Tribal Force, a nationalist rebel organization that fought for independence for the Tripura region in India, formed in 1990 and concluded a peace agreement in 1993. There is no evidence of the ATTF receiving support from Islamabad during this time, in part due to the inaccessibility of the area in which it was fighting from Pakistan.

Coding:

No Democratic Patronage; No Violation of the Democratic Embargo

Key Source(s):

Subrata K. Mitra, Siegfried O. Wolf, and Jivanta Schöttli, *A Political and Economic Dictionary of South Asia* (London: Routledge, 2006)

XXIII.   India-Pakistan and Bangladesh, BDSF/NDFB, 1992-2004

The Bodo Security Force, a nationalist group fighting for independence for a territorial homeland for the Bodo people, later changed its name to the National Democratic Front for Bodoland. There is no clear evidence of Pakistani support. After 1990, the Directorate-General of Forces Intelligence (Bangladesh) reportedly developed close ties with the NDFB, UNLF, PLA and ULFA, and NDFB bases were located in the Mymensingh region of Bangladesh. Both India and Bangladesh were democratic throughout the conflict and viewed each other as occasional rivals, with tensions rising and falling around border disputes.

Coding:

Democratic Patronage; Violation of the Democratic Embargo; Leadership Recognized Occasional Rivalry (Bangladesh Only)

Key Source(s):

Bhaumik, Subir, "Insurgencies in India's Northeast: Conflict, Co-option & Change," *East-West Center* 2007.

XXIV. <u>India-Pakistan and Bangladesh, UNLF, 1994-2009</u>

The UNLF is a left-leaning rebel group fighting for independence for Manipur, a state in northeast India. After 1990, Bangladeshi military intelligence and the Pakistani ISI reportedly developed close links with Manipuri groups such as the PLA and the UNLF, including weapons, training, and safe houses. India and Pakistan were democratic throughout the 1990s and viewed each other as mortal rivals.

Coding:

    Democratic Patronage; Violation of the Democratic Embargo; Leadership
      Recognized Rivalry

Key Source(s):

    Bhaumik, Subir, "Insurgencies in India's Northeast: Conflict, Co-option & Change,"
      East-West Center 2007.
    Lintner, Bertil, *Great Game East: India, China, and the Struggle for Asia's Most Volatile*
      Frontier (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015)

XXV. <u>India-Pakistan and Bangladesh, NLFT, 1995-2006</u>

NLFT is a nationalist rebel group fighting for separation from India and the creation of an independent Tripuri state. There is ambiguous evidence of Pakistani backing for the NLFT and clearer evidence of Bangladeshi support, including money, weapons and training. Lintner states that the NLFT and ATTF had 48 bases in Bangladesh until the pro-India Awami League returned to power in 2009. India and Bangladesh were democratic throughout the conflict while Pakistan was democratic until 1999. India and Pakistan viewed each other as mortal rivals while India and Bangladesh viewed each other as occasional rivals.

Coding:

    Potential Democratic Patronage; Potential Violation of the Democratic Embargo;
      Leadership Recognized Rivalry

Key Source(s):

    Kiessling, Hein, *Faith, Unity, Discipline: The Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan*
      (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016)
    Lintner, Bertil, *Great Game East: India, China, and the Struggle for Asia's Most Volatile*
      Frontier (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015)

XXVI. Nepal-India, CPN-M/UPF, 1996-2006

CPN-M is the Communist Party of Nepal, a Maoist group, which began a "people's war" in 1996. In 2006, the group signed peace accords with Nepal. India did not provide aid when Nepal was democratic, between 2002-2006. The US Department of State report in 2006 says of CPN-M: "External Aid: None"

Coding:

No Democratic Patronage; No Violation of the Democratic Embargo

Key Source(s):

Office of the Secretary of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism*, 2006 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2007)
Shakya, Sujeev, "Unleashing Nepal's Economic Potential: A Business Perspective," in Sebastian Von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Suman Pradhan, *Nepal in Transition: From People's War to Fragile Peace* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012)

XXVII. India-Pakistan and Bangladesh, ATTF, 1997-1999

The All Tripura Tribal Force, a rebel organization that fought for independence for the Tripura region in India, formed in 1990, and concluded a peace agreement with New Delhi in 1993. While there is some suggestion that Bangladesh permitted training bases for ATTF after 2000, there is no evidence of the ATTF receiving support from Islamabad or Dhaka during this time, in part due to the inaccessibility of the area in which the group was fighting.

Coding:

No Democratic Patronage; No Violation of the Democratic Embargo

Key Source(s):

Lintner, Bertil, *Great Game East: India, China, and the Struggle for Asia's Most Volatile Frontier* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015)
San-Akca, Belgin, *States in Disguise: Causes of State Support for Rebel Groups* (New York: Oxford, 2016)

XXVIII. Russia-Georgia, Republic of Chechnya, 1999-2007

In 2002, Russia alleged that Georgia aided rebels in neighboring Chechnya, including allowing rebels to operate in the Pankisi Gorge region of Georgia. Russia and Georgia agreed to jointly patrol the border, and the U.S. military trained Georgian troops to fight

against Chechen rebels that crossed the border. Credible claims of Georgian assistance soon ceased. Crucially, Georgia did not transition to democracy until January 2004.

Coding:

Democratic Patronage; No Violation of the Democratic Embargo

Key Source(s):

Turner, Barry, *The Statesman's Yearbook 2008: The Politics, Cultures and Economies of the World* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007)

XXIX. Israel-Russia, PFLP, 2001

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine received arms and money from the Soviet Union. There is no evidence of Russian support in 2001 and the prospect of such aid seems unlikely given the PFLP's turn toward jihadism. In 2002, the U.S. Department of State listed Syria and Iran as backers of the PFLP, but not Russia.

Coding:

No Democratic Patronage; No Violation of the Democratic Embargo

Key Source(s):

Office of the Secretary of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2002* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2003)

XXX. Thailand-Malaysia, Patani insurgents, 2003-2011

The Patani insurgency is waged in the south of Thailand by separatist Muslim rebels. There is no clear evidence of Malaysian patronage during the brief period of joint democracy in 2011. Instead, there is evidence of growing security cooperation between the two countries to target insurgents.

Coding:

No Democratic Patronage; No Violation of the Democratic Embargo

Key Source(s):

Isaacson, Jason F. and Colin Rubenstein, eds., *Islam in Asia: Changing Political Realities* (New York: Routledge, 2017)
Weatherbee, Donald E., *International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015)

XXXI. <u>Pakistan-India, BLA/Balochistan Liberation Army, 2004-2011</u>

The Balochistan Liberation Army is a rebel group fighting for independence of the Baloch people in Pakistan. Pakistan accused India of aiding the BLA, however there is no clear evidence of support during the period of joint democracy 2010-2011. San-Akca lists India as a patron only in 2008-2009. India may favor stability because it seeks access to Balochi oil and gas resources.

Coding:

Potential Democratic Patronage; No Violation of the Democratic Embargo

Key Source(s):

Bugti, Nawab Akbar Khan and Mir Balach Marri, "Balochistan Insurgency—Fifth Conflict 2004-to date," *GlobalSecurity.org*, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/balochistan-2004.htm
"Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan," International Crisis Group, 14 September 2006
San-Akca, Belgin, *States in Disguise: Causes of State Support for Rebel Groups* (New York: Oxford, 2016)
Wirsing, Robert G., "Baloch Nationalism and the Geopolitics of Energy Resources: The Changing Context of Separatism in Pakistan," Strategic Studies Institute, April 2008

XXXII. <u>Georgia-Russia, Republic of South Ossetia, 2004</u>

In August 2004, violence flared up in the contested territory of South Ossetia—which is central to Russia's longstanding rivalry with Georgia. Russia provided various types of material support to pro-Russian actors in South Ossetia and even granted citizenship to most people in the territory. Both Russia and Georgia were democratic at the time of the conflict, and each viewed the other as a significant rival.

Coding:

Democratic Patronage; Violation of the Democratic Embargo; Leadership Recognized Rivalry

Key Source(s):

George Hewitt, *Discordant Neighbours: A Reassessment of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Ossetian Conflicts* (Boston: Brill, 2013).

XXXIII.   India-Pakistan, CPI/Maoist, 2005-2011

The Communist Party of India is a Maoist insurgent group that seeks to overthrow the Indian government and establish a communist regime. It is connected to the various Naxalite groups that profess similar objectives. Stratfor describes a "very limited Pakistani-Naxalite relationship" that encompasses CPI-Maoist. Pakistan reportedly sold weaponry to rebels through third-party sources and there is evidence of a degree of liaison and coordination. India was democratic throughout the conflict period while Pakistan was democratic after 2010. Each state viewed the other as a mortal rival.

Coding:

Democratic Patronage; Violation of the Democratic Embargo; Leadership
    Recognized Rivalry

Key Source(s):

West, Ben, "Pakistan and the Naxalite Movement in India." *STRATFOR*, November
    18, 2010. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/pakistan-and-naxalite-movement-
    india

XXXIV.   Pakistan-United States, Israel, and India, TTP, 2008-2011

The TTP is the Pakistani Taliban. There is no evidence of United States or Israeli support, and both possibilities are extremely unlikely given the broader American fight against Islamist groups in the region. Neither is there credible evidence of Indian support. Pande, in *Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, says claims of Indian backing arise, "Despite the lack of evidence."

Coding:

No Democratic Patronage; No Violation of the Democratic Embargo

Key Source(s):

Pande, Aparna, *Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Escaping India* (New York:
    Routledge, 2011)
San-Akca, Belgin, *States in Disguise: Causes of State Support for Rebel Groups* (New York:
    Oxford, 2016)

XXXV. India-Pakistan, GNLA, 2009-2011

The GNLA is a nationalist separatist group fighting for an independent Garoland in northeast India. The GNLA leader has claimed that Pakistan provided aid, but the

evidence of Pakistani backing in the period of joint democracy is extremely ambiguous (2010-2011). It is not implausible, however, given the two states' mutual rivalry.

Coding:

> Potential Democratic Patronage; Potential Violation of the Democratic Embargo; Leadership Recognized Rivalry

Key Source(s):

> "Indian Military Outfit Says Pakistan's ISI Offered Support," *The Hindustan Times*, 22 May 2010. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/indian-militant-outfit-says-pakistan-s-isi-offered-help/story-CEnkjV8g5SMqqDsGy03KbO.html

APPENDIX D: **Coding and Identifying Democratic Rivals**

As described in the main text, we adopt rivalry as a scope condition to define the population of cases in which democratic would-be patrons might plausibly provide assistance to rebels fighting another democracy. To implement this scope condition, we rely almost exclusively on several prominent indicators of rivalry present in the IR literature. Our reliance on these pre-existing measures buffers against concerns that our coding of the cases might be unduly informed by our theoretical priors. To code rivalry, we use three pre-existing measures and one additional indicator of our own creation. The first three are those indicators developed by Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl (2016), David Dreyer and William R. Thompson (2010), and J. Joseph Hewitt (2005). Our original indicator is a measure of whether the leaders of patron states considered the incumbent state to be a rival. This indicator was only coded for cases of democratic embargo violation and the substantiation for each decision is reported in the relevant case summaries presented in Appendix C. Table D.1 reports the codings for the 16 conflicts identified in Table 2 in the main text as instances in which the democratic embargo was violated. Shifting the unit of analysis, Table 2 provides information on the 22 democratic patrons that provided support to rebels fighting their rival, including the dates of joint democracy and serious rivalry as well as whether aid was provided during the joint democracy/serious rivalry period. Table D. 3 provides information on the 49 democratic incumbents with democratic rivals that did not provide aid to the rebels they were fighting.

Rivalry

    Peace Data (v2.0) Dataset

    This dataset is an update of an earlier collection undertaken by Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl. Dyadic interstate relations are coded on a 5-point scale: 0.0 is "Serious Rivalry"; 0.25 is "Lesser Rivalry"; 0.5 is "Negative Peace"; 0.75 is "Warm Peace"; and 1.0 is "Security Community. "Serious Rivalries" are the most hostile dyadic interstate relationships, marked by active plans for military conflict, frequent militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), significant unresolved disputes, diplomatic hostility, and virtually no significant communication. "Lesser Rivalries" are marked by active plans for military conflict with each other, isolated MIDs, significant unresolved disputes, no diplomatic recognition, and virtually no significant communication with each another. "Negative Peace" is less intense, marked by the absence of war plans, no active conflicts, some outstanding significant disputes, diplomatic recognition, and some intergovernmental communication. "Warm Peace," by contrast, features the absence of war plans, no plausible counterfactual war scenarios, no significant unresolved disputes, normal diplomatic relations, and developed communication ties. Finally, "Security Communities" are the warmest relationships, marked by joint war planning, no plausible counterfactual war scenarios, no significant unresolved disputes, diplomatic coordination and institutionalized communication (Goertz et al., 2016: 25–46). For our purposes, we rescale the variables and code multiple versions of the variable (*variable name* in italics).

        rivalry: 0 = Security Community
                                     1 = Warm Peace
                                     2 = Negative Peace
                                     3 = Lesser Rivalry
                                     4 = Serious Rivalry

5 = Dyad Not Coded

This variable is coded for all incumbents in the dataset. Where a patron exists, the score is the rivalry between the incumbent and the patron. Where no patron supported rebels, the score represents the most intense rivalry in which the incumbent was engaged. Where one or more patrons supported the rebels, the most intense rivalry between the incumbent and (one of) the patron(s) is reported. When the most intense rivalry in which the incumbent was engaged fluctuated over the life of the conflict, the most conflictual rivalry status is reported.

rivalrydem:

This variable is coded for all incumbents in the dataset and is the same as *rivalry*, except where the rivalry between the incumbent and *democratic* supporter is less intense than the most intense rivalry in which the incumbent is engaged. In such cases, the rivalry between the incumbent and democratic supporter is coded according to the values noted above.

Strategic Rivalry Dataset

This dataset is compiled by William R. Thompson, as introduced in his 2001 article "Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics" and updated for the *Handbook of International Rivalries: 1494-2010* with David R. Dreyer (Dreyer and Thompson, 2010; Thompson, 2001). Strategic rivals are marked by mutual expectations of threat, rigid beliefs about the hostility inherent in the other, and domestic political processes that incentivize counter-rival behavior.(Thompson, 2001: 559–562) Operationally, strategic rivalries are: (1) comprised of independent states, (2) marked by discrete and identifiable onset dates, and (3) acknowledged in the minds and policies of principle decision makers.(Thompson, 2001: 562–568) As updated in 2011, the dataset designates 181 interstate dyads as "Strategic Rivalries." We code each of the dyads in which a violation of the democratic embargo is observed.

Crisis-Density Rivalry Dataset

This dataset is compiled by J. Joseph Hewitt and differs from the Peace Data and Strategic Rivalries datasets insofar as it prioritizes the incidence of crises as defined by the International Crisis Behavior Project as the indicator of rivalry rather than heavily weighting MIDs (Peace Data) and policymaker beliefs (Strategic Rivalries) (Hewitt, 2005). Rivalries are coded with respect to the density with which dyadic crises recur; the more often and more frequently a pair of states become engaged in crises, the more intense their rivalry. Using this standard, 417 rivalries are identified in the 1918-2001 period, with 31 designated as "Enduring," 41 as "Proto," and 345 as "Isolated." "Enduring" rivalries are the most intense and consist of at least three crises, last longer than 20 years, and do not have lengthy lapses

between crises. "Proto" rivalries involve at least three crises but last less than 20 years; "Isolated" rivalries involve fewer than three crises and last less than 20 years (Hewitt, 2005: 190). We code each of the dyads in which a violation of the democratic embargo is observed.

Table D.1: Inter-Democratic Rivalry and Rebel Patronage

Incumbent-Patron(s)	Rebel Group	Conflict Year(s)	Goertz/Diehl Rivalry Status	Thompson Rivalry Status	Hewitt Rivalry Status	Patron(s) Leadership Recognition of Rivalry
India-Pakistan	NNC	1956-1968	Serious	Strategic	Enduring	✔
India-Pakistan	PLA	1982-1988	Serious	Strategic	Enduring	✔
Sudan-Israel	SPLM	1983-2004	Not Coded	Not Coded	Not Coded	✔
India-Pakistan	Sikh Insurgents	1983-1993	Serious	Strategic	Enduring	✔
Turkey-Greece	PKK/Kadek	1984-2011*	Serious	Strategic	Enduring	✔
India-Pakistan	Kashmir Insurgents	1989-2011*	Serious	Strategic	Enduring	✔
India-Pakistan	Naxalites/PWG	1990-2004	Serious	Strategic	Enduring	✔
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	UFLA	1990-2009	Serious (Both)	Strategic (P)	Enduring (P)	✔
India-Pakistan	MCC	1992-2004	Serious	Strategic	Enduring	✔
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	NSCN	1992-2000	Serious (Both)	Strategic (P)	Enduring (P)	✔
India-Bangladesh	BDSF/NDFB	1992-2004	Negative Peace	Not Coded	Not Coded	✔
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	UNLF	1994-2009	Serious (Both)	Strategic (P)	Enduring (P)	✔
India-Pakistan, Bangladesh	NLFT	1995-2006	Serious (Both)	Strategic (P)	Enduring (P)	✔
Georgia-Russia	Republic of South Ossetia	2004	Serious	Not Coded	Enduring	✔
India-Pakistan	CPI-Maoist	2005-2011*	Serious	Strategic	Enduring	✔
India-Pakistan	GNLA	2009-2011*	Serious	Strategic	Enduring	✔

* Conflict continued beyond dataset end-date

Table D.2: Instances of Democratic Patrons Aiding Rebels Fighting Democratic Rivals

Incumbent	Rebels	Conflict Dates	Patron	Serious Rivals Through-out Conflict	Patron Dem. Through-out Conflict	Joint Democratic + Serious Rivalry Dates	Support During Joint Dem. + Serious Rivalry
India	NNC	1/1/1956-6/15/1968	Pakistan	Yes	No	3/1/1956-10/8/1958	Yes
India	PLA	7/13/1982-12/31/1988	Pakistan	Yes	No	11/17/1988-12/31/1988	Yes
India	Sikh Insurgents	8/20/1983-12/31/1993	Pakistan	Yes	No	11/17/1988-12/31/1993	Yes
Turkey	PKK/ Kadek	8/15/1984-12/31/2011*	Greece	Yes	Yes	8/15/1984-12/31/2011	Ambiguous
India	Kashmir Insurgents	12/11/1989-12/31/2011*	Pakistan	Yes	No	12/11/1989-10/12/1999; 4/19/2010-12/31/2011	Yes
India	Naxalites/ PWG	1/1/1990-9/20/2004	Pakistan	Yes	No	1/1/1990-10/12/1999	Yes
India	UFLA	2/1/1990-12/31/2009	Pakistan	Yes	No	2/1/1990-10/12/1999	Yes
India	UFLA	2/1/1990-12/31/2009	Bangladesh	Yes	No	9/26/1991-9/9/2007	Yes
India	MCC	4/6/1992-9/20/2004	Pakistan	Yes	No	4/6/1992-10/12/1999	Yes
India	NSCN	7/31/1992-12/31/2000	Pakistan	Yes	No	7/31/1992-10/12/1999	Yes
India	NSCN	7/31/1992-12/31/2000	Bangladesh	Yes	Yes	7/31/1992-12/31/2000	Yes
India	ATTF	10/12/1992-8/23/1993	Pakistan	Yes	Yes	10/12/1992-8/23/1993	Yes
India	ATTF	10/12/1992-8/23/1993	Bangladesh	Yes	Yes	10/12/1992-8/23/1993	Yes
India	BDSF/ NDFB	11/21/1992-12/31/2004	Pakistan	Yes	No	11/21/1992-10/12/1999	Yes
India	BDSF/ NDFB	11/21/1992-12/31/2004	Bangladesh	Yes	Yes	11/21/1992-12/31/2004	Yes
India	UNLF	8/21/1984-12/31/2009	Pakistan	Yes	No	8/21/1994-10/12/1999	Yes
India	UNLF	8/21/1984-12/31/2009	Bangladesh	Yes	No	8/21/1994-9/9/2007	Yes
India	NLFT	10/1/1995-12/31/2006	Pakistan	Yes	No	10/1/1995-10/12-1999	Ambiguous
India	NLFT	10/1/1995-12/31/2006	Bangladesh	Yes	Yes	10/1/1995-12/31/2006	Yes
Georgia	Republic of South Ossetia	8/19/2004-8/19/2004	Russia	Yes	Yes	8/19/2004-8/19/2004	Yes
India	CPI-Maoist	1/30/2005-12/31/2011*	Pakistan	Yes	No	4/19/2010-12/31/2011	Yes
India	GNLA	1/1/2009-12/31/2011*	Pakistan	Yes	No	4/19/2010-12/31/2011	Ambiguous

* Conflict continued beyond dataset end-date

Table D.3: Instances of Democratic Non-Patronage of Rebels Fighting Democratic Rivals

Incumbent	Rebels	Conflict Dates	Serious Rival	Serious Rivals Throughout Conflict	Serious Rival Democratic Throughout Conflict	Joint Dem + Serious Rival Dates
Israel	Palestinian Insurgents	1/1/1949-12/31/1964	Syria	Yes	No	2/26/1954-2/1/1958
United Kingdom	PIRA/IRA	8/1/1971-12/15/1991	Argentina	No	No	10/30/1983-10/19/1989
Pakistan	Baluchi Separatists	1/1/1974-7/5/1977	India	Yes	Yes	10/30/1983-10/19/1989
Argentina	ERP	8/11/1974-12/31/1977	United Kingdom	No	Yes	2/4/1976-3/25/1976
Bangladesh	JSS/SB/Shanti Bahini	2/1/1975-11/15/1992	India	No	Yes	9/26/1991-11/15/1992
Colombia	FARC	1/1/1978-12/31/2011*	Venezuela	No	No	7/13/1982-12/17/2006
Colombia	M-19	5/28/1978-12/31/1988	Venezuela	No	Yes	7/13/1982-12/31/1988
El Salvador	FMLN	9/2/1980-12/31/1991	Honduras	Yes	No	6/2/1984-11/24/1985; 11/27/1989-12/31/1991
Venezuela	Bandera Roja	1/1/1982-10/4/1982	Colombia	No	Yes	7/13/1982-10/4/1982
Nicaragua	FDN/Contras	3/18/1982-4/19/1990	United States	No	Yes	2/27/1990-4/19/1990
Nicaragua	FDN/Contras	3/18/1982-4/19/1990	Honduras	Yes	No	2/27/1990-4/19/1990
Nicaragua	FDN/Contras	3/18/1982-4/19/1990	Costa Rica	Yes	Yes	2/27/1990-4/19/1990
Peru	Sendero Luminoso	8/22/1982-12/31/1999	Ecuador	No	Yes	8/22/1982-4/5/1992
India	Sikh Insurgents	8/20/1983-12/31/1993	Bangladesh	Yes	No	9/26/1991-12/31/1993
Colombia	ELN	1/1/1984-12/31/2010	Venezuela	Yes	No	1/1/1984-12/17/2006
Colombia	EPL	1/1/1984-12/31/1990	Venezuela	Yes	Yes	1/1/1984-12/31/1990
Turkey	PKK/Kadek	8/15/1984-12/31/2011*	Cyprus	Yes	Yes	8/15/1984-12/31/2011
Peru	MRTA	3/14/1989-12/31/1993	Ecuador	Yes	Yes	3/14/1989-4/5/1992
India	ABSU	3/16/1989-12/31/1990	Pakistan	Yes	Yes	3/16/1989-12/31/1990
India	Kashmir Insurgents	12/11/1989-12/31/2011*	Bangladesh	Yes	No	9/26/1991-9/9/2007
Pakistan	MQM	1/1/1990-12/31/1990	India	Yes	Yes	1/1/1990-12/31/1990
India	Naxalites/PWG	1/1/1990-9/20/2004	Bangladesh	Yes	No	926/1991-9/20/2004
Turkey	Devrimci Sol	7/13/1991-10/7/1992	Greece	Yes	Yes	7/13/1991-10/7.1992
Turkey	Devrimci Sol	7/13/1991-10/7/1992	Cyprus	Yes	Yes	7/13/1991-10/7/1992

Venezuela	Military Faction (Hugo Chavez)	2/4/1992-11/29/1992	Colombia	Yes	Yes	2/4/1992-11/29/1992
Venezuela	Military Faction (Hugo Chavez)	2/4/1992-11/29/1992	Guyana	Yes	Yes	2/4/1992-11/29/1992
India	PLA	1/1/1992-12/31/1998	Pakistan	Yes	Yes	1/1/1992-12/31/1998
India	MCC	4/6/1992-9/20/2004	Bangladesh	Yes	Yes	4/6/1992-9/20/2004
Bangladesh	PBCP	1/1/1994-12/31/2011*	India	Yes	Yes	1/1/1994-9/9/2007
Pakistan	MQM	1/1/1995-12/13/1996	India	Yes	Yes	1/1/1995-12/13/1996
India	ATTF	1/1/1997-12/31/1999	Pakistan	Yes	No	1/1/1997-10/12/1999
India	ATTF	1/1/1997-12/31/1999	Bangladesh	Yes	Yes	1/1/1997-12/31/1999
India	KNF	7/13/1997-12/31/1997	Pakistan	Yes	Yes	7/13/1997-12/31/1997
India	KNF	7/13/1997-12/31/1997	Bangladesh	Yes	Yes	7/13/1997-12/31/1997
Russia	Republic of Chechnya	8/7/1999-12/31/2007	Japan	Yes	Yes	8/7/1999-12/31/2007
Russia	Republic of Chechnya	8/7/1999-12/31/2007	Georgia	Yes	No	1/24/2004-12/31/2007
Bangladesh	PBCP-Janajudhha	1/1/2003-12/31/2011*	India	Yes	Yes	1/1/2003-12/31/2011
Colombia	EPL	1/1/2004-12/31/2004	Venezuela	Yes	Yes	1/1/2004-12/31/2004
India	PLA	1/1/2004-12/31/2006	Bangladesh	Yes	Yes	1/1/2004-12/31/2006
Pakistan	BLA	1/1/2004-12/31/2011*	India	Yes	Yes	1/1/2004-12/31/2011
Pakistan	Lashkar-e-Islam	1/1/2004-12/31/2011*	India	Yes	Yes	1/1/2004-12/31/2011
Turkey	MKP	1/1/2005-12/31/2005	Greece	Yes	Yes	1/1/2005-12/31/2005
Turkey	MKP	1/1/2005-12/31/2005	Cyprus	Yes	Yes	1/1/2005-12/31/2005
India	NSCN-K	1/1/2005-12/31/2007	Bangladesh	Yes	No	1/1/2005-9/9/2007
India	CPI-Maoist	1/30/2005-12/31/2011*	Bangladesh	Yes	No	1/30/2005-9/9/2007
Israel	Popular Resistance Committees	1/1/2006-12/31/2006	Lebanon	Yes	Yes	1/1/2006-12/31/2006
Israel	Hezbollah	1/1/2006-12/31/2006	Lebanon	Yes	Yes	1/1/2006-12/31/2006
Pakistan	TTP	1/1/2008-12/31/2011*	India	Yes	Yes	1/1/2008-12/31/2011
India	NDFB-RD	1/13/2009-12/31/2010	Pakistan	Yes	No	4/19/2010-12/31/2010

* Conflict continued beyond dataset end-date

APPENDIX E: Institutional Strength and the Democratic Embargo

To code institutional strength, we rely on several pre-existing measures of governance arrangements. Following from our reliance on the Polity (v4.0) topline indicators of regime type, we use the six component indicators of governance structures and procedures (Marshall and Jaggers, 2012). To check against the possibility that the Polity indicators are missing important institutional characteristics of regimes, we also use several indicators drawn from the V-Dem Project (Pemstein et al., 2019). Finally, because military influence over political decision-making could weaken both normative and institutional checks against inter-democratic hostility, we also employ measures of whether the head of state was a military officer during the conflict or whether the military played an important role in government decision-making (Geddes et al., 2014; Scartascini et al., 2018). In this Appendix, we first discuss each of these indicators. Table E.1 replicates Table 3 in the main text, reporting the results of a bivariate analysis of institutional strength and democratic embargo violations. Tables E.2a, E.2b, E.3a, E.3b, E.4a, E.4b, E.5a, and E.5b provide complete information on each of the indicators for the four types of (non-)patrons identified in Table E.1/Table 3 and underpinning the results summarized in Table 4 in the main text.

Institutional Strength

Polity (v4.0)

As noted in Appendix A, Polity is the most commonly used indicator of regime type in the quantitative study of IR. Its topline regime type scores are a function of the weighting of six component indicators that address the institutional underpinnings of governance within states. They are: *xrreg*, which captures the extent to which the selection of executives follows regular, established procedures; *xrcomp*, which captures the extent to which the competitors for executive leadership have equal opportunities for achieving office; *xropen*, which captures the extent to which the politically active population has a theoretical opportunity of becoming the executive; *xconst*, which captures the extent to which executives are subject to institutionalized constraints on their power and decision-making; *parreg*, which captures the extent to which citizens' political participation is governed by binding rules on when, whether, and how their preferences are expressed; and *parcomp*, which captures the extent to which alternative policy and leadership preferences can be expressed and pursued in political debate and activity (Marshall et al., 2017: 20–27). We assign values for these six variables for each of the democracies (Polity +6) that were serious rivals of democratic incumbents in our larger dataset. Following the weighting procedures employed in the Polity project to generate topline regime type scores from these indicators (Marshall et al., 2017: 14–16), we assign determinations of whether or not democratic patrons descended to non-democratic status at some point during the course of the conflict for each according to the following schema:

xrreg:	Yes = Polity codes 2, 3
	No = Polity code 1[1]
xrcomp:	Yes = Polity code 1

---

[1] In principle, a code of 1 could refer to regular non-democratic mechanisms of executive transition like hereditary monarchy. In coding all such states with *xrreg* values of 1 as having not employed non-democratic institutions, we are thus biasing our analysis against the likelihood of finding a correlation between institutional fragility and violation of the democratic embargo.

	No = Polity codes 2, 3
xropen:	Yes = Polity codes 1, 2
	No = Polity codes 3, 4
xconst:	Yes = Polity codes 1, 2, 3
	No = Polity codes 4, 5, 6, 7
parreg:	Yes = Polity codes 3, 4
	No = Polity codes 1, 2, 5
parcomp:	Yes = Polity codes 1, 2
	No = Polity codes 3, 4, 5

V-Dem Project

As noted in Appendix A, the V-Dem Project offers an alternative set of measures of regime type centered around what its creators deem to be the five high-level principles of democracy: electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian (Pemstein et al., 2019). Underpinning several of the indices described above are narrower evaluations of institutional strength. We use the collected data to ascertain whether, by the selected measures, the democracies involved in serious rivalries with democratic incumbents descended into non-democratic status at some point during the conflict. The six measures of institutional strength employed (*variable name* in italics) are: (1) Freedom of Expression and Alternative Sources of Information (*v2x_freexp_altinf*); (2) Civil Society Participation (*v2x_cspart*); (3) Share of Population with Suffrage (*v2x_suffr*); (4) Clean Elections Index (*v2xel_frefair*); (5) Judicial Constraints on the Executive Index (*v2x_jucon*); and (6) Legislative Constraints on the Executive Index (*v2xlg_legcon*) (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Luehrmann, Marquardt, McMann, Paxton, Pemstein, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Cornell, et al., 2019: 42–44, 46). Each variable is presented in ordinal form, with three, four, and five categories. To allow for the greatest likelihood that institutions will be designated as democratic, and bias against our finding our hypothesized correlation, we use the five-category ordinal versions. Whether or not the democratic (non-)patron rivals descended into non-democratic status according to each measure is assigned according to the following schema:

v2x_freexp_altinf_5C:	Yes = V-Dem codes 0.0, 0.25, 0.5
	No = V-Dem codes 0.75, 1.0
v2x_cspart_5C:	Yes = V-Dem codes 0.0, 0.25, 0.5
	No = V-Dem codes 0.75, 1.0
v2x_suffr_5C:	Yes = V-Dem codes 0.0, 0.25, 0.5
	No = V-Dem codes 0.75, 1.0
v2xel_frefair_5C:	Yes = V-Dem codes 0.0, 0.25, 0.5
	No = V-Dem codes 0.75, 1.0
v2x_jucon_5C:	Yes = V-Dem codes 0.0, 0.25, 0.5
	No = V-Dem codes 0.75, 1.0
v2xlg_legcon_5C:	Yes = V-Dem codes 0.0, 0.25, 0.5
	No = V-Dem codes 0.75, 1.0

Civil-Military Relations

We use three measures of civil-military relations that capture elements of the relative balance between political and military elites in democratic (non-)patron rivals of democratic incumbents. The first is taken from the V-Dem Project and measures the extent to which the power base of the chief executive is determined by the military. The variable is continuous; we code military predominance for all values of 0.5 or greater (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Luehrmann, Marquardt, McMann, Paxton, Pemstein, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Cornell, et al., 2019: 260; Teorell and Lindberg, 2019). The second is that developed by Carlos Scartascini, Cesi Cruz, and Philip Keefer and provides a categorical variable designating whether a state's head of state in any given year is a military officer (1) or not (0) (Scartascini et al., 2018). We code the democracies that violated the democratic embargo and had a military leader for at least a portion of the conflict period as having unbalanced civil-military relations. The dataset only provides coverage between 1975 and 2017, so we hand-coded the Pakistani aid to the NNC in its fight against India, 1956-1968 and Syrian non-aid to Palestinian insurgents fighting Israel, 1949-1964. The third measure is that developed by Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, which provides a categorical variable that designates regimes as one of ten different types: (1) Indirect military; (2) Military; (3) Military-Personal; (4) Monarchy; (5) Oligarchy; (6) Party; (7) Party-Military; (8) Party-Military-Personal; (9) Party-Personal; and (10) Personal (Geddes et al., 2014). We code the democratic (non-)patron rivals designated as (1), (2), (3), (7), and (8) as having unbalanced civil-military relations.

Table E.1: Institutional Strength and Democratic Embargo Violation among Rivals

		Patronage		
		No	Yes	**Total**
Institutions	Weak	14	15	**29**
	Strong	35	7	**42**
	Total	**49**	**22**	**71**

$\chi^2 = 9.859$, p = 0.002

Table E.2a: Democratic Patrons with Weak Institutions

Incumbent-Patron(s)	Rebel Group	Conflict Year(s)	Patron(s) Polity Score Non-Democratic During Conflict	Change in Patron(s) Polity Score During Conflict	Patron(s) Polity Component Scores Non-Democratic During Conflict					
					Exec. Recruit. Regulated	Exec. Recruit. Competitive	Exec. Recruit. Open	Exec. Constraints	Particip. Regulated	Particip. Competitive
India-Pakistan	NNC	1956-1968	✓	-15	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	PLA	1982-1998	✓	-15	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	Sikh Insurgents	1983-1993	✓	-15	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	Kashmir Insurgents	1989-2011*	✓	-14	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	Naxalites/PWG	1990-2004	✓	-14	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	UFLA	1990-2009	✓	-14	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Bangladesh	UFLA	1990-2009	✓	-12		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	MCC	1992-2004	✓	-14	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	NSCN	1992-2000	✓	-14	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	BDSF/NDFB	1992-2004	✓	-14	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	UNLF	1994-2009	✓	-14	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Bangladesh	UNLF	1994-2009	✓	-12		✓		✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	NLFT	1995-2006	✓	-14	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	CPI-Maoist	2005-2011*	✓	-11		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	GNLA	2009-2011*	✓	-1	✓					
Totals			**15/15**	**-12.9**	**12/15**	**14/15**	**13/15**	**14/15**	**14/15**	**14/15**

* Conflict continued beyond dataset end-date

Table E.2b: Democratic Patrons with Weak Institutions

Incumbent-Patron(s)	Rebel Group	Conflict Year(s)	Patron(s) V-Dem Indicator Scores Non-Democratic During Conflict**						Patron(s) Civil-Military Relations During Conflict		
			Freedom of Expression	Civil Society Particip.	Share Popular Suffrage	Free and Fair Elections	Jud. Constr. on Exec.	Leg. Constr. on Exec.	Military as Political Power Base (V-Dem)	Military Officer as Head of State (Scartascini et al)	Regime Type Includes Military Component (Geddes et al)
India-Pakistan	NNC	1956-1968	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓***	✓
India-Pakistan	PLA	1982-1988	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	Sikh Insurgents	1983-1993	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	Kashmir Insurgents	1989-2011*		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	Naxalites/PWG	1990-2004		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	UFLA	1990-2009		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Bangladesh	UFLA	1990-2009		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	MCC	1992-2004		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	NSCN	1992-2000		✓		✓	✓	✓			✓
India-Pakistan	BDSF/NDFB	1992-2004		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	UNLF	1994-2009		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Bangladesh	UNLF	1994-2009					✓	✓			✓
India-Pakistan	NLFT	1995-2006		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	CPI-Maoist	2005-2011*				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	GNLA	2009-2011*				✓			✓		
Totals			3/15	12/15	0/15	14/15	14/15	14/15	13/15	12/15	14/15

* Conflict continued beyond dataset end-date   ** All scores derived from the 5-category classification for each indicator   ***Coded by authors

52

Table E.3a: Democratic Patrons with Strong Institutions

Incumbent-Patron(s)	Rebel Group	Conflict Year(s)	Patron(s) Polity Score Non-Democratic During Conflict	Change in Patron(s) Polity Score During Conflict	Patron(s) Polity Component Scores Non-Democratic During Conflict					
					Exec. Recruit. Regulated	Exec. Recruit. Competitive	Exec. Recruit. Open	Exec. Constraints	Particip. Regulated	Particip. Competitive
Turkey-Greece	PKK/Kadek	1984-2011*		-2						
India-Bangladesh	NSCN	1992-2000		0						
India-Pakistan	ATTF	1992-1993		0	✓					
India-Bangladesh	ATTF	1992-1993		0	✓					
India-Bangladesh	BDSF/NDFB	1992-2004		0						
India-Bangladesh	NLFT	1995-2006		0						
Georgia-Russia	Republic of South Ossetia	2004		0						
Totals			**0/7**	**-0.3**	**2/7**	**0/7**	**0/7**	**0/7**	**0/7**	**0/7**

* Conflict continued beyond dataset end-date

Table E.3b: Democratic Patrons with Strong Institutions

Incumbent-Patron(s)	Rebel Group	Conflict Year(s)	Patron(s) V-Dem Indicator Scores Non-Democratic During Conflict**						Patron(s) Civil-Military Relations During Conflict		
			Freedom of Expression	Civil Society Particip.	Share Popular Suffrage	Free and Fair Elections	Jud. Constr. on Exec.	Leg. Constr. on Exec.	Military as Political Power Base (V-Dem)	Military Officer as Head of State (Scartascini et al)	Regime Type Includes Military Component (Geddes et al)
Turkey-Greece	PKK/Kadek	1984-2011*									
India-Bangladesh	NSCN	1992-2000				✓	✓	✓			
India-Pakistan	ATTF	1992-1993		✓		✓	✓	✓			
India-Bangladesh	ATTF	1992-1993				✓	✓	✓			
India-Bangladesh	BDSF/NDFB	1992-2004					✓	✓			✓
India-Bangladesh	NLFT	1995-2006					✓	✓			✓
Georgia-Russia	Republic of South Ossetia	2004	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓			
Totals			1/7	2/7	0/7	4/7	6/7	6/7	0/7	0/7	2/7

* Conflict continued beyond dataset end-date   ** All scores derived from the 5-category classification for each indicator

Table E.4a: Democratic Non-Patrons with Weak Institutions

Incumbent-Rival	Rebel Group	Conflict Year(s)	Rival Polity Score Non-Democratic During Conflict	Change in Rival Polity Score During Conflict	Rival Polity Component Scores Non-Democratic During Conflict					
					Exec. Recruit. Regulated	Exec. Recruit. Competitive	Exec. Recruit. Open	Exec. Constraints	Particip. Regulated	Particip. Competitive
Israel-Syria	Palestinian Insurgents	1949-1964	✓	-14	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
United Kingdom-Argentina	PIRA/IRA	1971-1991	✓	-17	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Colombia-Venezuela	FARC	1978-2011*	✓	-12	✓	✓		✓	✓	
El Salvador-Honduras	FMLN	1980-1991	✓	-5	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Nicaragua-Honduras	FDN/Contras	1982-1990	✓	-1	✓					
India-Bangladesh	Sikh Insurgents	1983-1993	✓	-13	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Colombia-Venezuela	ELN	1984-2010	✓	-12	✓	✓		✓	✓	
India-Bangladesh	Kashmir Insurgents	1989-2011*	✓	-12	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Bangladesh	Naxalites/PWG	1990-2004	✓	-11	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	ATTF	1997-1999	✓	-13	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Russia-Georgia	Republic of Chechnya	1999-2007	✓	-2	✓				✓	
India-Bangladesh	NSCN-K	2005-2007	✓	-12	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
India-Bangladesh	CPI-Maoist	2005-2011*	✓	-12	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
India-Pakistan	NDFB-RD	2009-2010	✓	-1	✓					
Totals			**14/14**	**-9.8**	**14/14**	**11/14**	**5/14**	**11/14**	**12/14**	**9/14**

* Conflict continued beyond dataset end-date

Table E.4b: Democratic Non-Patrons with Weak Institutions

Incumbent-Rival	Rebel Group	Conflict Year(s)	Rival V-Dem Indicator Scores Non-Democratic During Conflict**						Rival Civil-Military Relations During Conflict		
			Freedom of Expression	Civil Society Particip.	Share Popular Suffrage	Free and Fair Elections	Jud. Constr. on Exec.	Leg. Constr. on Exec.	Military as Political Power Base (V-Dem)	Military Officer as Head of State (Scartascini et al)	Regime Type Includes Military Component (Geddes et al)
Israel-Syria	Palestinian Insurgents	1949-1964	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓***	✓
United Kingdom-Argentina	PIRA/IRA	1971-1991	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Colombia-Venezuela	FARC	1978-2011*		✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	
El Salvador-Honduras	FMLN	1980-1991	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Nicaragua-Honduras	FDN/Contras	1982-1990	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓			
India-Bangladesh	Sikh Insurgents	1983-1993	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Colombia-Venezuela	ELN	1984-2010		✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	
India-Bangladesh	Kashmir Insurgents	1989-2011*	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
India-Bangladesh	Naxalites/PWG	1990-2004	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
India-Pakistan	ATTF	1997-1999		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		
Russia-Georgia	Republic of Chechnya	1999-2007		✓		✓	✓	✓			
India-Bangladesh	NSCN-K	2005-2007				✓	✓	✓			
India-Bangladesh	CPI-Maoist	2005-2011*				✓	✓	✓			✓
India-Pakistan	NDFB-RD	2009-2010				✓					
Totals			7/14	11/14	1/14	14/14	13/14	13/14	7/14	8/14	5/14

* Conflict continued beyond dataset end-date   ** All scores derived from the 5-category classification for each indicator   ***Coded by authors

Table E.5a: Democratic Non-Patrons with Strong Institutions

Incumbent-Rival	Rebel Group	Conflict Year(s)	Rival Polity Score Non-Democratic During Conflict	Change in Rival Polity Score During Conflict	Rival Polity Component Scores Non-Democratic During Conflict					
					Exec. Recruit. Regulated	Exec. Recruit. Competitive	Exec. Recruit. Open	Exec. Constraints	Particip. Regulated	Particip. Competitive
Pakistan-India	Baluchi Separatists	1974-1977		-2						
Argentina-United Kingdom	ERP	1974-1977		0						
Bangladesh-India	JSS/SB/Shanti Bahini	1975-1992		-1						
Colombia-Venezuela	M-19	1978-1988		0						
Venezuela-Colombia	Bandera Roja	1982		0						
Nicaragua-United States	FDN/Contras	1982-1990		0						
Nicaragua-Costa Rica	FDN/Contras	1982-1990		0						
Peru-Ecuador	Sendero-Luminoso	1982-1999		-1						
Colombia-Venezuela	EPL	1984-1990		0						
Turkey-Cyprus	PKK/Kadek	1984-2011*		0						
Peru-Ecuador	MRTA	1989-1993		0						
India-Pakistan	ABSU	1989-1990		0						
Pakistan-India	MQM	1990		0						
Turkey-Greece	Devrimci Sol	1991-1992		0						
Turkey-Cyprus	Devrimci Sol	1991-1992		0						
Venezuela-Colombia	Military Faction (Hugo Chavez)	1992		0						
Venezuela-Guyana	Military Faction (Hugo Chavez)	1992		0						

India-Pakistan	PLA	1992-1998		-1							
India-Bangladesh	MCC	1992-2004		0							
Bangladesh-India	PBCP	1994-2011*		-1							
Pakistan-India	MQM	1995-1996		0							
India-Bangladesh	ATTF	1997-1999		0							
India-Pakistan	KNF	1997		0							
India-Bangladesh	KNF	1997		0							
Russia-Japan	Republic of Chechnya	1999-2007		0							
Bangladesh-India	PBCP-Janajudhha	2003-2011*		0							
Colombia-Venezuela	EPL	2004		0							
India-Bangladesh	PLA	2004-2006		0							
Pakistan-India	BLA	2004-2011*		0							
Pakistan-India	Lashkar-e-Islam	2004-2011*		0							
Turkey-Greece	MKP	2005		0							
Turkey-Cyprus	MKP	2005		0							
Israel-Lebanon	Popular Resistance Committees	2006		0	✓						
Israel-Lebanon	Hezbollah	2006		0	✓						
Pakistan-India	TTP	2008-2011*		0							
Totals			**0/35**	**-0.2**	**2/35**	**0/35**	**0/35**	**0/35**	**0/35**	**0/35**	

* Conflict continued beyond dataset end-date

Table E.5b: Democratic Non-Patrons with Strong Institutions

Incumbent-Rival	Rebel Group	Conflict Year(s)	Rival V-Dem Indicator Scores Non-Democratic During Conflict**						Rival Civil-Military Relations During Conflict		
			Freedom of Expression	Civil Society Particip.	Share Popular Suffrage	Free and Fair Elections	Jud. Constr. on Exec.	Leg. Constr. on Exec.	Military as Political Power Base (V-Dem)	Military Officer as Head of State (Scartascini et al)	Regime Type Includes Military Component (Geddes et al)
Pakistan-India	Baluchi Separatists	1974-1977	✓	✓				✓			
Argentina-United Kingdom	ERP	1974-1977									
Bangladesh-India	JSS/SB/Shanti Bahini	1975-1992	✓	✓				✓			
Colombia-Venezuela	M-19	1978-1988									
Venezuela-Colombia	Bandera Roja	1982	✓	✓							
Nicaragua-United States	FDN/Contras	1982-1990									
Nicaragua-Costa Rica	FDN/Contras	1982-1990									
Peru-Ecuador	Sendero-Luminoso	1982-1999		✓			✓		✓		
Colombia-Venezuela	EPL	1984-1990									
Turkey-Cyprus	PKK/Kadek	1984-2011*									
Peru-Ecuador	MRTA	1989-1993					✓		✓		
India-Pakistan	ABSU	1989-1990		✓		✓	✓	✓			
Pakistan-India	MQM	1990									
Turkey-Greece	Devrimci Sol	1991-1992									
Turkey-Cyprus	Devrimci Sol	1991-1992									
Venezuela-Colombia	Military Faction (Hugo Chavez)	1992									

Dyad	Actor	Years									
Venezuela-Guyana	Military Faction (Hugo Chavez)	1992	✓			✓		✓			
India-Pakistan	PLA	1992-1998		✓		✓	✓	✓			
India-Bangladesh	MCC	1992-2004				✓	✓	✓			
Bangladesh-India	PBCP	1994-2011*									
Pakistan-India	MQM	1995-1996									
India-Bangladesh	ATTF	1997-1999				✓	✓	✓			
India-Pakistan	KNF	1997		✓		✓	✓	✓			
India-Bangladesh	KNF	1997				✓	✓	✓			
Russia-Japan	Republic of Chechnya	1999-2007									
Bangladesh-India	PBCP-Janajudhha	2003-2011*									
Colombia-Venezuela	EPL	2004					✓	✓		✓	
India-Bangladesh	PLA	2004-2006				✓	✓	✓			
Pakistan-India	BLA	2004-2011*									
Pakistan-India	Lashkar-e-Islam	2004-2011*									
Turkey-Greece	MKP	2005									
Turkey-Cyprus	MKP	2005									
Israel-Lebanon	Popular Resistance Committees	2006				✓	✓	✓		✓	
Israel-Lebanon	Hezbollah	2006				✓	✓	✓		✓	
Pakistan-India	TTP	2008-2011*									
Totals			**4/35**	**7/35**	**0/35**	**10/35**	**12/35**	**13/35**	**2/35**	**3/35**	**0/35**

* Conflict continued beyond dataset end-date   ** All scores derived from the 5-category classification for each indicator

REFERENCES

Exclusive of Key References for Case Narratives, Noted in Appendix C

Coppedge M, Gerring J, Knutsen CH, Lindberg SI, Teorell J, Altman D, Bernhard M, Fish MS, Glynn A, Hicken A, Luehrmann A, Marquardt KL, McMann K, Paxton P, Pemstein D, Seim B, Sigman R, Skaaning S-E, Staton J, Cornell A, et al. (2019) V-Dem Codebook v9. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

Coppedge M, Gerring J, Knutsen CH, Lindberg SI, Teorell J, Altman D, Bernhard M, Fish MS, Glynn A, Hicken A, Luehrmann A, Marquardt KL, McMann K, Paxton P, Pemstein D, Seim B, Sigman R, Skaaning S-E, Staton J, Wilson S, et al. (2019) V-Dem Country-Year Dataset v9. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. Available at: https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-9/.

Cunningham DE, Gleditsch KS and Salehyan I (2013) Non-state Actors in Civil Wars: A New Dataset. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 30(5): 516–531.

Dreyer D and Thompson WR (2010) *Handbook of International Rivalries*. Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press.

Freedom House (n.d.) Freedom in the World. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world (accessed 3 April 2019).

Geddes B, Wright J and Frantz E (2014) Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set. *Perspectives on Politics* 12(2): 313–331.

Goertz G, Diehl PF and Balas A (2016) *The Puzzle of Peace: The Evolution of Peace in the International System*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hewitt JJ (2005) A Crisis-Density Formulation for Identifying Rivalries. *Journal of Peace Research* 42(2): 183–200.

Luttwak E (1979) *Coup d'Etat; a Practical Handbook*. New York: Knopf.

Marshall MG and Jaggers K (2012) *Polity IV Annual Time Series 1800-2011*. College Park, MD: Center for Systemic Peace. Available at: http://systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.

Marshall MG, Gurr TR and Jaggers K (2017) Polity IV Project: Dataset Users' Manual. Center for Systemic Peace.

Pemstein D, Marquardt KL, Tzelgov E, et al. (2019) The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data. Working Paper No. 21, 4th edition. Varieties of Democracy Institute, University of Gothenburg.

Puddington A, Dunham J, Aghekyan E, et al. (eds) (2018) *Freedom in the World 2017*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

San-Akca B (2016) *States in Disguise: Causes of State Support for Rebel Groups*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Scartascini C, Cruz C and Keefer P (2018) *The Database of Political Institutions 2017 (DPI2017)*. 16 March. Inter-American Development Bank. DOI: 10.18235/0001027.

Teorell J and Lindberg SI (2019) Beyond Democracy-Dictatorship Measures: A New Framework Capturing Executive Bases of Power, 1789-2016. *Perspectives on Politics* 17(1): 66–84.

Thompson WR (2001) Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics. *International Studies Quarterly* 45(4): 557–586.